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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on economic development and experimental economics.
In Chapter 1, I present experimental evidence about how Thais treat information from
domestic and foreign sources. Thai students answer a series of objective general-knowledge
questions, both before and after observing answers given by American students and other Thai
students. By looking at how subjects update their original answers after observing information,
it is possible to estimate the weights that subjects assign to themselves, the American answers
they see, and the Thai answers they see. Consistent with previous studies, I find that Thais
exhibit a significant level of overconfidence in that they overweigh their initial answers. Despite
their overconfidence, the relative weight that they give to answers given by Americans compared
to answers given by other Thais is, in most instances, statistically indistinguishable from the
optimal solution. Moreover, the experimental design allows me to distinguish between two
possible explanations for this fact. Under one hypothesis, subjects overestimate the relative
precision of American answers, but fail to recognize the value of independence, and the two
errors cancel each other out. Under a second hypothesis, subjects recognize the relative accuracy
of each group and appreciate the value of independence. The data rejects the first hypothesis
and supports the second.
In Chapter 2, I report the results of an experiment that tests for the presence of an infor-
mation endowment effect. Experimental evidence suggests that an individual who is endowed
with a coffee mug or chocolate bar demands a much higher price to sell than an unendowed
person is willing to pay to acquire the same good. This study shows that a similar phenomenon
does not exist when the endowment consists of information rather than goods. The results
suggest that the endowment effect operates primarily on preferences as opposed to judgment.
In Chapter 3, my co-author and I use econometric methods to create a data set that makes it
possible to better identify what areas of Thailand are poor and unequal. We show the potential
for our results to improve policies targeted at poor households.
Thesis Supervisor: Esther Duflo
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
How Does an Advisor's Nationality
Affect the Weight Given to Her
Advice? Experimental Evidence
from Thailand
Summary 1 It is sometimes assumed that people in some developing countries accord excessive
weight to outside information, particularly information from the West. However, this apparent
excess weight may in fact be optimal if people recognize the value of the independence in Western
information. This paper reports an experiment designed to investigate this issue. Thai students
answer a series of objective general-knowledge questions, both before and after observing answers
given by American students and other Thai students. By looking at how subjects update their
original answers after observing information, it is possible to estimate the weights that subjects
assign to themselves, the American answers they see, and the Thai answers they see. I develop
and estimate an econometric model of information aggregation to see how subjects would update
their answers if they used information optimally. Consistent with previous studies, I find that
Thais exhibit a significant level of overconfidence in that they overweigh their initial answers.
Despite their overconfidence, the relative weight that they give to answers given by Americans
compared to answers given by other Thais is, in most instances, statistically indistinguishable
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from the optimal solution. Moreover, the experimental design allows me to distinguish between
two possible explanations for this fact. Under one hypothesis, subjects overestimate the relative
precision of American answers, but fail to recognize the value of independence, and the two
errors cancel each other out. Under a second hypothesis, subjects recognize the relative accuracy
of each group and appreciate the value of independence. The data rejects the first hypothesis
and supports the second.
1.1 Introduction
How people in developing countries incorporate the opinions of others when making decisions is
acknowledged as a crucial issue. Previous research has looked at how information sharing within
social networks affects technology adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Duflo, Kremer, and
Robinson (2004), Munshi (2004)). Information sharing is also vital in promoting public health
(Dearden, Pritchett, and Brown (2004), Hsieh and Lin (1997)) and in helping individuals make
better decisions about how to save their income (Duflo and Saez (2002)). This research generally
shows that having neighbors who have the right information helps people make good decisions.
At the same time, it is more difficult for those individuals who have neighbors with the wrong
information to make good decisions (Miguel and Kremer (2004), Munshi and Myaux (2002)).
An outside group's independent perspective could help to break the cycle of bad information
circulated within poorly informed groups (Menon and Pfeffer (2003)).
Casual observation suggests that Thais accord a large weight to outside information, in
particular Western information. Many Thais believe that this presumed behavior comes from
a simple irrational preference for all things Western. The underlying idea is that Western
information receives more weight than it should. However, this apparent excess weight could
actually be optimal if Thais appreciate the value of independence in Western information. Do
people in developing countries appreciate the value of considering an independent perspective
when making decisions? If Thais put high weight on Western information, for example, could
this in part reflect an appreciation of the value of its independence from a Thai's viewpoint?
Do Thais exhibit overconfidence in the sense that they do not listen enough to any source of
information'? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to answer these questions.
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In the first stage of the experiment, American and Thai introductory economics students
answered general-knowledge questions in three broad categories: 1) questions about Bangkok
or Thailand, 2) questions about Boston or the US, and 3) questions about both of them. Each
question has a correct answer. For example, one question asked subjects about the average high
daily temperature in January in Bangkok, the average high daily temperature in January in
Boston, and the sum of those temperatures. Subjects answered questions in a variety of areas
including weather, economic data, and social indicators. In the second stage of the experiment, a
separate set of Thai students first answered the same set of questions as the first stage students.
They then observed randomly selected Thai and American answers from the first stage to help
them update their answers. For any given question, a subject observed information about
the Bangkok part, the Boston part, the sum part, or all three. Figure 1 shows an example of
what one group of subjects saw for the question about January temperature. These subjects
saw that one Thai student thought the high January temperature in Boston was 23°C, another
Thai thought the answer was 20°C, and that an American student thought the answer was
2°C. By looking at how subjects use the answers they observe to update their initial answers,
this experimental design provides estimates of the weights that subjects applied to observed
American answers, to observed Thai answers, and to their own initial answers.
In addition, the empirical distribution of answers provides estimates of the weights that
subjects would optimally use to minimize the mean-squared error of their final answers.1 Both
an econometric model and a non-parametric test are used to characterize optimal behavior. The
optimal weights are a function of the mean-squared errors (MSE) of Americans and Thais and
the shares of MSE that comes from group biases. If the Thai bias share is large, for example,
Thais tend to make the same kinds of mistakes. When this is the case, the independent
American perspective is especially valuable. A Thai subject, and the other Thais she observes,
generally think it is fairly warm in Boston in January and they need an outside voice to correct
this mistake. Even when any one Thai answer is equally good as any one American answer, the
fact that the error has a group component means that an optimizing Thai should assign higher
1 In later sections, a simple model of Bayesian updating is used to derive the optimal weights individuals should
use when processing the information they observe. It it shown that this model's predictions are not sensitive to
parametric assumptions. See Genest and Schervish (1985), West (1992), and West and Crosse (1992) for more
general models of Bayesian updating.
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weight to American answers than to other Thai answers. The American answers, which do not
contain the bias that she shares with other Thais, are more valuable to a Thai subject. The
questions about both Bangkok and Boston illustrate this idea. In terms of MSE, Americans
and Thais are about equally good at answering these questions. Nevertheless, I show that the
presence of group bias means that an optimizing Thai should put more than twice as much
weight on an observed American answer than an observed Thai answer.
For the questions about both Boston and Bangkok (the sum questions) and those that
refer to Boston only, the hypothesis that subjects apply the optimal weight ratio to weigh the
observed American answers compared to the observed Thai answers cannot be rejected. Based
on how good each group is at answering the questions and the extent of group bias, subjects
should put about five times as much weight on American answers for the Boston questions
and about two-and-a-half times as much weight on American answers for the questions about
both Bangkok and Boston. They come very close to that behavior, and equality cannot be
rejected. For questions that refer to Bangkok only, subjects actually underweigh American
answers. When the questions do not refer to Bangkok, subjects perform well despite showing a
considerable amount of overconfidence through excessive weight given to their initial answers. 2
A large psychological literature shows that individuals exhibit overconfidence in a variety of
environments (Griffin and Tversky (1992), Keren (1987), Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting
(1991), Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). The fact that, in the experiment reported in this paper,
overconfidence coexists with otherwise rational behavior fits with Camerer and Lovallo's (1999)
conclusions about their subjects.3 I show that the Thais in the experiment could decrease their
MSE only slightly by changing how they relatively weigh observed Thai compared to observed
American information, but they could decrease it substantially by reducing their overconfidence.
Moreover, the experimental design makes it possible to show that, when the questions do
not refer specifically to Bangkok, subjects treat the information they observe in a sophisticated
way. To a Thai subject, American information has extra value due to its independence from
2A test reveals that anchoring is not the cause of my finding of severe overconfidence. This test involves a
treatment group that did not provide initial answers before observing the randomly selected American and Thai
answers.
3Discussing their results from an experiment in which individuals opened businesses in the lab, Camerer and
Lovallo (1999) states "This is not to say that subjects behave irrationally - indeed, they forecast the number of
competitors quite well, and pass most tests of expectational rationality. They are simply overconfident."
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her perspective. This value comes from the fact that Thais tend to make the same kind of
mistake and Americans do not share that group bias. It is possible to reject the hypothesis
that subjects fail to recognize the fact that each group makes a different kind of mistake. In
contrast, the hypothesis that subjects appreciate how good each group is at answering the
questions and that each group makes its own kind of mistake can explain the data quite well.
Despite their overconfidence, subjects show remarkable sophistication when deciding how to
relatively weight the American information they see compared to the Thai information they
see. The experimental results support the appropriateness of modeling economic agents who
are irrational in one dimension, but rational in others.
Section 2 describes the experimental design. In Section 3, I provide a framework for analyz-
ing information aggregation. Section 4 contains the summary statistics that give the optimal
relative American-to-Thai weights that subjects should apply. In Section 5, I report the esti-
mates of how subjects weigh their private signals and the answers that they observe, including
a variety of tests for different behaviors. Using the nature of a subset of questions, Section 6
tests the hypothesis that subjects do not account for the fact that they tend to make the same
mistakes as other Thais. Section 7 looks at how subjects could have improved their performance
by changing their behavior in various ways. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Experimental Design
Below is a description of the questionnaire that the students answered, the random selection of
answers for the main treatment group, and two special groups included in the experiment.
1.2.1 Questions
The set of fifteen questions covered a range of topics. Thirteen of these questions had three parts.
For example, one question asked about Thai and American political leaders. One part asked for
the number of Thai prime ministers since 1960, another part asked for the number of American
presidents since 1960, and the third part asked for the sum of those two numbers. One other
question asked about the number of 25-29 year-olds with some university education. Another
asks about January temperature. Appendix 1 contains the entire questionnaire, showing the
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format for all of the questions.
The presence of a group of questions makes it possible to estimate in a general way how much
of the mistake that a group member makes comes from the common group effect. For example,
Thais erroneously answer high as a group for the January Boston temperature. By looking
across questions, the experiment can generally estimate what share of the mistakes that people
make is attributable to the group and how much is individual variation.4 If, across questions,
it is consistently the case that the group mean is distant from the truth and that there is little
dispersion around the group mean, then the share of total MSE that can be attributed to the
group is large.
Previous research has shown that subjects show overconfidence when asked to answer general
knowledge questions and that overconfidence is amplified when the questions are difficult (Griffin
and Tversky (1992)). In my experiment, the questions needed to be difficult. It was important
that subjects have considerable uncertainty about the answers to the question, so that the
provided information would be of value in resolving that uncertainty. This question difficulty
could be expected to lead to substantial overconfidence. The experimental design makes it
possible both to control for overconfidence and to look directly at how subjects treat observed
American information compared to observed Thai information.
1.2.2 Stage 1: Creating a pool of American and Thai answers
In Stage 1 of the experiment, 116 introductory economics students at MIT and 130 introductory
economics students at Thammasat University's Rangsit campus answered the series of questions,
giving estimates of the population distribution of private signals for each question. Students
had 15 minutes to answer the survey. In both countries, the questionnaire was given at the end
of introductory economics classes. In Thailand, the questionnaire and instructions were given
in Thai. 5
Subjects received monetary rewards for answering accurately. For the American students,
the top three performers on the entire set of questions received $50 and the top fifteen performers
on the individual questions received $10. Among the Thai students, the top five performers
4 Section 4 describes the simple procedure for calculating within-group correlation.
5Five translations and re-translations, as well as two pilots, were used to verify accuracy.
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on the overall questionnaire received 1000 baht (approximately $25) and the top twenty on the
individual questions received 200 baht. The additional rewards for the Thai students reflected
the larger sample size.
Subjects also answered an optional personal survey before completing the questionnaire.
The American students were asked to indicate their country of citizenship and the country
where they attended high school, since some MIT undergraduates are citizens of other countries.
Excluding this group of students from the sample has a negligible effect on the distribution of
answers. Therefore, random selection of answers was based on the entire set of MIT students.
1.2.3 Stage 2: Subjects observe American and Thai information
In Stage 2, 300 economics undergraduates at Thammasat's Ta Pra Chan campus and master's
economics students at the National Institute for Development Administration (NIDA) first re-
ceived instructions (both read aloud and given in a packet) and then answered the 15 questions.
Subjects were informed that they would receive 100 baht for participating and 20 baht for each
question that they answered within a range of being correct. To encourage effort on all ques-
tions, the range was wider for more difficult questions, and subjects were informed of this. For
example, subjects had to answer very closely for the question about Bangkok temperature to
receive payment and much less closely for the question about US GNP. The goal of the incen-
tives was to approximately provide subjects with the objective of minimizing the MSE of their
answers, while keeping the instructions as simple as possible. In Section 7, it is shown that an
individual who seeks to maximize her payments would act in the same way as a mean-squared
error minimizer.
In Stage 2, subjects first answered all of the questions using Microsoft Excel in computer
labs at NIDA and Thammasat. They directly answered the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US
questions and the sum was calculated from those answers. After all subjects answered the
questions, they received a second set of instructions. Subjects were told that they would
observe randomly selected answers from MIT and Thammasat-Rangsit students who answered
the same set of questions. These answers were provided in a separate packet. In the packet,
for each question, subjects saw (as in Figure 1) the heading "Answers from Thai students"
followed by the Thai information, and then "Answers from American students" followed by the
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American information. Payments were based on subjects' final answers.
For each question, a subject saw information about either the Bangkok/Thailand question,
the Boston/US question, the sum question, or all three, each with i probability. Subjects in
the main group saw up to three American answers and up to Thai answers. For each question,
a subject could observe any of twenty randomly selected sets of American and Thai answers.
1.2.4 Special groups: Anchoring and large samples
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) shows that individuals will tend to stick to a number that is
given to them, even when that number is irrelevant to the question at hand, a phenomenon they
called anchoring. In my experiment, subjects first answer the questions and then update their
answers based on what they observe. Thus, anchoring is a serious concern in this experiment;
a subject provides her own answer to which she can anchor and that number is relevant to the
final answer that she gives.
Due to these concerns, an additional 42 students observed randomly selected answers and
answered the questions, without first providing their private signals. This provides an opportu-
nity to derive a test for anchoring. In the experimental data, a subject who anchors would fail
to sufficiently change the answer that she gives after observing information, even though her
true belief changes. If anchoring is present, the 42 subjects who do not provide their private
signals will choose final answers closer to the answers they observe, since they cannot stick to
their initial answer purely due to the fact that they express it.
In addition, 50 of the 300 students in the main group observed large samples for two ques-
tions. 6 Subjects saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers. The model of information
aggregation presented in the next section applies to any amounts of American and Thai infor-
mation that subjects see. Subjects may treat large amounts of information differently, though,
either due to difficulties with processing all the information or a lower bound to the weight a
subject will give to herself. The presence of large samples makes it possible to see how subjects
behave when they see large amounts of information.
6These are questions 4 (high daily January temperature) and 8 (number of prime ministers/presidents).
15
1.3 Model of Information
1.3.1 The importance of the group effect
Described here is a general model of information aggregation that shows how subjects will weigh
the information they see, under the assumption that they are mean-squared error (MSE) mini-
mizers. Each question type (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum) is considered separately.
For a question q, take individual i in group j to have a private signal Xijq about the correct
answer for the question. The mean-squared error Ajq for a group j for question q is then
Nj
q2 1 - (xijq - Truthq) 2 , (1.1)
j i=l
where Nj is the number of group j members in the sample and Truthq is the correct answer for
question q. A group that is comparatively better at answering the question will have a lower
MSE for the question. The population distributions obtained in Stage 1 will give estimates for
A2q (the mean squared error for Americans) and A4 q (the mean squared error for Thais) for
each question q.
The group MSE can be broken down into the sample variance for the group (2q) and the
squared group bias (O2q), where jq is the population mean for group j for question q.
1 Nj
Ajq -j E [(Xij q - jq)2 (jq - Truthq)2]
-= N 3(Xijq -, Pjq)' + (jq - Truthq)2
2 2Sjq + jq
The presence of the group bias term accounts for the fact that individuals in group j may make
the same kind of mistake in answering question q.
Define the share of a group's MSE that comes from the group effect by pjq
q (.2)
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For group j for question q, pjq captures what share of total MSE comes from the common group
bias. If individuals in group j make different kinds of mistakes from other individuals in their
group, pjq will be low, as MSE will primarily be caused by the sample variance. If people make
the same kind of mistake, pjq will be high, since group bias will cause most of the group's MSE.
A2I focus on three parameters of interest. The first is the American-to-Thai MSE ratio, t.
Tq
When this is high, Americans are less accurate at answering the questions relative to Thais.
The other two parameters of interest are the American and Thai group bias shares. Given the
description of subject behavior in the following subsection, of primary interest are the averages
of these parameters across questions. Where Nq is the number of questions,
A2 IN A q i Nq Nq
A 2 Nq A2-, PA NE PAq, and PT = PTq(13)T q==1 Tq - q=l qq=1
If the group bias share for Americans is low, for example, then multiple American guesses
would provide more information about the true value. On the other hand, when the American
group bias share is high, then a large group of American private beliefs is only slightly more
informative than a single American private belief, because Americans tend to make the same
kind of mistake. When the American (Thai) group bias share is greater than zero, it is rational
to put lower weight on any one piece of American (Thai) information when more American
(Thai) answers are available. Importantly, it is rational for a Thai subject to put lower weight
on an observed Thai answer even when she observes only one Thai answer. As a Thai individual,
she shares the same group bias with the observed Thai.
1.3.2 A model of subject behavior
Described here is a model of how subjects treat the information they observe. A Thai subject
is unlikely to treat an observed Thai answer the same as her private signal. When problems are
difficult, individuals have shown overconfidence in a wide variety of environments (Griffin and
Tversky (1992), Keren (1987), Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). To account for this, a subject's
own perceived MSE is modeled as a fraction c of another Thai's. Where A2q is a subject's
perceived MSE for question q,
sq = cTA2q, (1.4)
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and overconfidence implies c < 1. This way of measuring overconfidence corresponds to much
of the psychological literature. Overconfidence is often measured by looking at how small a
subject's confidence interval is for a quantity given to what it should be (Cesarini, Sandewall,
and Johanneson (2003)). The formulation of overconfidence here implies that a subject perceives
her confidence interval to be c times the width of another Thai's, for any given confidence level.
It is assumed that a subject also perceives her bias to be the same fraction of another Thai's
bias. Her perceived correlation with another Thai is then the same fraction c of the correlation
between two other Thais.
rsq = CCeTq j E((xsq - Truthq)(xTq - Truthq)) = cPTA/q. (1.5)
A subject is assumed to minimize the expected MSE of her final answer. She weighs infor-
mation according to her perceptions of how relatively good each group is at answering the type
of question and how much of each group's MSE is captured by the group effect. Her behavior
is a function of her perceptions of
A2
A2 PT, and PA ·
A
The optimal weights a subject would use are a function of the actual values of the parameters.
For the case where subjects see nA American answers (xA1 through XAnA) and nT Thai
answers (XT1 through XTnT), a subject's objective function is:
E(MSE) =E (T(XT1 + ... + XTn) + A(xA1 + ... + XAnA) + sXs - Truth)
where
= weight for own information
AT = weight for any one piece of Thai information
PA = weight for any one piece of American information
Assuming that nT,/T + nA/A + s = 1 so that the sum of the weights put on all pieces of
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information is one, this equation becomes
E(MSE) = E T (xTk - Truth) + iA Z(xAk - Truth) + is(xs - Truth)
k=l k=l
Also assume that subjects perceive that the group biases are uncorrelated: E((XTkT -
Truth)(xAk 4 - Truth)) = 0 . The data does not reject the hypothesis that the actual group
biases are uncorrelated.
E(MSE) = nT/TT + nT(nT - 1)02PTA + LnAA2A A + nA(nA - 1)/3PAA
+ C02 2+2cnTiT3spTA T + CTAT
The first two terms in the above expression describe the expected MSE of all the observed Thai
answers and the error that comes from the shared group bias among the nT Thais (a total of
nT(nT - 1) interactions). The next two terms capture the analogous errors for the observed
American answers. The next-to-last term describes the shared group bias between the subject
herself and the other Thais she observes. The final term describes the subject's own perceived
MSE.
Taking the derivatives with respect to the weights gives the weights that subjects actually use
and the optimal weights they should use to minimize MSE. The weights that subjects actually
use are determined by subjects' perceptions of the parameter values. The optimal weights come
from substitution of the actual parameter values into the same expressions, taking c as given.
That is, the optimal weights will define optimal behavior given any level of overconfidence. The
unconstrained optimal weights are found by using c = 1 (no overconfidence).
The actual weights are described by the following ratios.
cor c - C (PT)perceived) (1.6)Fr T 1i: T - 6
OT C C 1-(PT)perceived
For n = O, nA > 1: l =(2 ' (1 -(PA)perceived + (PA)perceived nA) (1.7)
A2 c o
-A kT, perceived
For lnA (2 ) 1 + (nT - 1)(PT)perceived- (PT) perceivedfn a
A AT tAperceived (1 + (nA - 1d)PA)perceived)(1 - (PT)perceived
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The optimal weights are described by the same equations, with the actual parameter values
substituted for the perceived values.
For nT > 1: /s 1 1-c( (PT)actual (1.9)
3T C C l--(PT)actal
/3O a (1-(PA)actal (PA)actual ) (1.10)
For nT 1, n 1: = + (nT - 1)(P )actual - C(PT)actualnT 1 11)
T actual (1 + (nA - 1)(PA)actual)(1 - (PT)actual)
Equation (1.6) is the ratio of the self-weight to the weight for other Thais and thus the
accuracy of Thais does not matter. But group bias does matter. When PT is high and subjects
are overconfident, the weight that subjects put on other Thais becomes small. When the group
effect accounts for more of total MSE, an overconfident subject puts more trust in her reading
of the joint Thai information than in another Thai's report. If c = 1, she puts equal weight on
herself and another Thai.
Equation (1.7) is the ratio of the self-weight to the weight subjects put on observed Amer-
icans when nT = 0. Subjects put more weight on Americans when Americans are perceived
A 2
to be more accurate. This corresponds to subjects perceiving 4 to be low. When c is low,
subjects put less weight on American answers, since subjects perceive themselves to be better
at answering the question. When PA is high, subjects treat each additional American answer
after the first as providing little added value. Dividing each side by nA gives the optimal ratio
of own-weight to total weight given to all American information.
1nA/A (T) perceived -(PA)perceied + (PA)perceived (1.12)A A T per c nA c
This shows more clearly that when the perceived PA is high, subjects put less weight on each
American answer when they observe more of them.
Equation (1.8) gives the weight ratio that subjects assign to an American answer relative to
an observed Thai answer. Not surprisingly subjects put higher weight on American information
when A2 is low relative to A2. Also when PA is low and PT is high, subjects put higher relative
weight on American information.
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The overconfidence parameter enters the expression in a second-order way through the
cpTnT term. For reasonable values of PT, overconfidence has a small, but noticeable, effect
on the relative weight ratio that subjects use for American versus Thai information. When
overconfidence is high (c is lower), subjects put more relative weight on Americans because a
subject overweighs herself relative to a Thai both through (1.4) and (1.5), but only through
(1.4) relative to an American. In other words, an overconfident subject trusts her reading
of the common Thai information for a given question. Another way to think of this is that
overconfident subjects are already putting high weight on Thai information through the weight
they give to themselves.
One important detail to notice is that PA only causes subjects to put less weight on individual
American answers when nA is greater than one, but that PT causes subjects to put less weight
on observed Thais even when only one Thai is observed. When one Thai is observed, there are
two Thai answers to consider: a subject's own answer and the one she observes. As a result,
the group effect enters (1.8) when nT = 1, but not when nA = 1.
The experimental data on how subjects update their answers provide estimates of the actual
weights that; subjects use. While the experiment does not directly observe subjects' perceptions
of A, PT, and PA, Sections 5 and 6 will describe tests that make it possible to reject several
possibilities for subject perceptions.
1.3.3 Non-structural optimal weight estimation
This section presents a series of non-structural tests for optimal behavior that complement
the decision-making model's set of optimal weights. Checking how closely the non-structural
estimates of the optimal weights match the model's estimates provides a test of the model's
appropriateness.
Given that subjects minimize mean-squared error, the optimal weights that subjects should
apply can be estimated from a simple regression. To run this regression, the data is first stan-
dardized to put each question on the same scale. Where the subscript i denotes the individual, j
denotes the group (either A or T), and q denotes the question, any variable Xijq is standardized
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in the following way 7
Xijq - XTq
2 (STq + SAq)
In the above equation, Tq is the standard deviation of the Thai answers, SAq is the standard
deviation of the American answers, and xTq is the mean of the Thai answers, for question q.
Where
Truthq = (standardized) correct answer for question q,
ZiAq = (standardized) average observed American answer for question q seen by subject i,
ZiTq = (standardized) average observed Thai answer for question q seen by subject i,
Ziq = (standardized) initial answer for the subject who is choosing,
the regression equation is
Truthq = rAZiAq + CeTziTq + CesZiq + Eiq (1.13)
Without parametric assumptions, this regression estimates the weights that a subject should
use to minimize her mean-squared prediction error. This regression can be expanded to include
additional terms, such as terms that account for the numbers of observed American and Thai
answers, niA and niT). The results that come from estimating (1.13) will be discussed in
Section 5, along with the estimation of actual subject behavior. To estimate actual behavior,
I simply replace Truthq in (1.13) with the subject's final answer. This gives the weights that
subjects actually assign to their initial answers, the American answers they observe, and the
Thai answers they observe.
7Another possibility is to use the standard deviation of the Thai answers to standardize. For questions where
Thais have a small standard deviation, this will cause the American mean to be far from zero, if the American
and Thai means are different. These points can then have excessive influence on the regression. The results are
not sensitive to alternative ways of standardizing the data.
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1.4 Summary Statistics
The data on subjects' private signals shows that group bias is an important consideration. As
an example, figures 2A, 2B, and 2C show kernel density estimates for the Thai and American
answers for the questions about high daily January temperature. 8 The figures show that Thais
have a mean answer of 20°C for the Boston January temperature (truth=2°C), and Americans
have a mean of 20°C for the Bangkok temperature (truth=32°C). Across questions, knowing
where the Thai mean is relative to the truth is uninformative about where the American mean
is relative to the truth.
Based on the set of American and Thai answers for all of the questions, the Thai-to-American
mean-squared error ratio can be estimated. If, as is estimated for the questions about Thailand,
-Ais 0.517, the expected squared distance between a randomly selected Thai answer and the
truth is 0.517 times the expected squared distance between a randomly selected American
answer and the truth.
Consider the questions of any type (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum). The ratio
of the mean squared error for Thais relative to Americans can be calculated for each of the
thirteen questions. The average across questions provides the MLE for the MSE ratio for the
two groups for a given type of question:
2~ - 13 A2
2 1 E 2 (1.14)
Table 1 summarizes the relative Thai-to-American accuracy for each of the three question
types. The estimates in Table 1 come from the 116 American answers and the 430 Thais who
provided their private signals.9
Thais have about one-half the MSE of Americans for the Thai questions. Americans are
about three times more accurate for the questions about the US, and 2 is about 1.3 for the
A
8These are Epanechnikov kernel estimates with optimally chosen bandwidth.
9Thai subjects were informed that the answers they observed came from MIT students and Thammasat-
Rangsit students. So if subjects had different perceptions about Thammasat-Rangsit than the universe of all
subjects, it would be appropriate to use only the 130 Thai students from Stage 1 to calculate variances and
correlations. The ratios are nearly the same if just the Stage 1 students are used to estimate the variances and
correlations.
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sum questions. These ratios establish the relative weights that subjects would optimally apply
A 2
if they ignored group bias. A Thai using ~ to relatively weigh observed American answers
versus observed Thai answers would ignore the fact that she tends to make the same mistakes
as other Thais.
The experimental design also enables me to estimate the share of group bias in total MSE for
each question type (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum). For each question, the realization
of the group effect, Cajq, is used to estimate the bias for group j for question q.
jq = NT ( XiTq) - Truthq = XTq - Truthq (1.15)
The share of the group effect (jq) in total mean squared error (Aq) is
Jqj2 = 2~ (1.16)
The estimate of the group bias share for each question type is the mean of q2$q across questions:
-l j q == Oj 13 q(1.17)
13 ~13jq
This captures the share of the group's total MSE for which the group effect is responsible.
Theorem 1: Equation (1.17) is the MLE for pj under the model.
Appendix 2 contains the proof for Theorem 1. Table 2 displays the group bias shares that
(1.17) gives for each question type.
Importantly, the bias shares are larger for the question types about which each group has
less knowledge. The share of total Thai mean squared error that comes from the group effect
is smallest for the Bangkok/Thailand questions and largest for the Boston/US questions. In
contrast, the share of total American mean squared error that comes from the group effect is
smallest for the Boston/US questions and largest for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. For
example, in the sample question in the introduction, Thais make small errors about the average
high daily January Bangkok temperature and the group effect is a small share of that error. On
the other hand, Thais make much larger errors when guessing the January Boston temperature,
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and a larger share of their mistakes comes from the fact that the group mean for Thais is 200C.
As will be shown in Section 6, this has important implications for the optimal weights for
the case where subjects see information for the sum question only. If subjects correctly account
for group bias when deciding how to treat the information they observe, this will have the same
implications for the weights they actually use.
In summary, the answer distributions show significant group biases for both Americans and
Thais. American answers thus have extra value to a Thai due to the independence of observed
American answers compared to observed Thai answers from her perspective. An optimizing
Thai subject needs to account for this when deciding how to weigh the American answers they
see compared to the Thai answers they see.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Estimating subject behavior
A simple regression provides the weights that subjects give to the information they observe
and to their own private signals. This involves regressing subjects' final answers on their initial
answers, the American answers they see, and the Thai answers they see. If subjects increase
their answers more in response to high observed American answers than to high observed Thai
answers, this will be reflected in a higher relative weight for the American answers.
The following regression estimates the average weights that a subject puts on American an-
swers (A), other Thai answers (T), and her own private signal (s), modeling an individual's
final choice as a linear combination of the average American answer she sees, the average Thai
answer that she sees, and her own initial answer. Where
Yiq = (standardized) choice of individual i,
ZiAq = (standardized) average observed American answer for question q seen by subject i,
ZiTq = (standardized) average observed Thai answer for question q seen by subject i,
Ziq = (standardized) initial answer for the subject who is choosing,
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the regression equation is
Yiq = AZiAq + PTZiTq + sZiq + eiq (1.18)
Equation (1.18) can be estimated with or without a constant and with or without assuming
that the weights sum to one. Each of these corresponds to what would be expected of a
rational agent. The first assumption states that if a subject gives an initial answer of zero
and observes an American and Thai average of zero, she will give a final answer of zero. The
second assumption states that a subject is assumed to put total weight of one on all information
available to her. In all cases, these restrictions cannot be rejected. I focus on the unrestricted
results because they have higher standard errors than the restricted results, which leads to more
conservative hypothesis tests.
In the next subsection, I describe the weight estimates that come from (1.18). When subjects
observe answers for the sum question only, it is important to note that subjects update their
answers for both the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions. This means that there is
more uncertainty about the answers that a subject sees; she does not see direct information
about the answers she changes. As a result, it is not correct to compare estimates of fs from
(1.18) to optimal estimates based on the assumption that subjects update specifically for the
sum question. Optimizing behavior in terms of choosing A (for the sum question), though,
is the same whether updating occurs directly for the sum question or the observed answers to
the sum question are used to update for the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions. In
other words, when subjects observe answers for the sum question only, regression (1.18) gives
a shortcut for estimating A for the sum question. Subject behavior on the Bangkok/Thailand
and Boston/US questions when subjects observe answers for the sum question only will be
considered in detail in Section 6.4.
Note that optimal behavior involves choosing different weights for different amounts, niA and
niT, of observed information. When a subject observes more American answers, for example, a
higher weight should be attributed to the American average since it contains more information.
A high PA implies that there is less new information in each additional American answer. When
the group bias share is higher, a subject should put less additional weight on each American
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answer when she sees more of them.
While not necessary for subjects to apply the correct weights on average, if subjects have
some knowledge of the group MSEs for individual questions, they will apply higher weight
to American information when it is relatively better. To see if subjects behave this way, the
regression can be expanded to include a term that captures group accuracy across questions:
Accq q+Tq (1.19)
When Accq is high, Americans are better relative to Thais for the question q.
Subjects may also want to account for the spread in the answers they observe. For example,
when subjects see two answers that are near each other and one answer that is extreme, they
may ignore the extreme answer. To look at this, the regression can be expanded to include a
term that captures the spread in the observed answers. The spread is measured simply as the
standard deviation in the observed information. Where Xijq is the ith observation from group
j for question q, this measure is
1 2
SDjq Nj -1 Zijq Zij (1.20)j - i=
Results when the SDAq and SDTq terms are included are available from the author upon
request. Inclusion of these terms has no effect on the results to be discussed in the following
sections.
The full regression allows each weight to vary with each term, so that the weights are
modeled in the following way:
Ps = s,i + Ps,2niA + s,3niT + /s,4Accq (1.21)
HA = 3A,1 + A,2niA + PA,3niT + A,4 Accq (1.22)
PT = T,1 + T,2niA + PT,3niT + /3T,4Accq (1.23)
The regression results indicate that subjects sometimes go beyond simply weighting the averages
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that they see. For all types of questions, they apply higher relative weights to American
information for those questions on which Americans answer relatively well.
1.5.2 Estimated weights used by subjects
The equation (1.18) regressions give the estimated average weights that subjects put on Thai
answers, American answers, and their own initial answers for each question type. Tables 3A,
3B, and 3C report the results. The cases where individuals see answers for all three types of
questions are included in the regressions for the Thai and US questions. For the regressions
for the sum question, these observations are left out. The assumption is that subjects reason
based on the direct information that they see about the Thai and US questions.l 0
Table 3A shows the weights that subjects use when they observe both American and Thai
information for the questions about Bangkok and Thailand. Consider the first column. Subjects
put a weight of 0.654 on their private beliefs, 0.242 on the observed Thai average, and 0.058
on the observed American average. The model estimates that subjects assign 4.2 times more
weight to the observed Thai answers than to American answers.
Table 3B shows the weights that subjects use when they observe both American and Thai
information for the questions about Boston and the US. Again, consider the first column. The
model estimates that subjects assign 5.1 times more weight to American answers than to other
Thai answers, giving estimates of 0.461 for the own-weight, 0.092 for the Thai weight, and 0.466
for the American weight.
Table 3C shows the weights that subjects use when they observe both American and Thai
information for the questions about the sum. The regression estimates that subjects assign 2.4
times more weight to American answers than to observed Thai answers, giving estimates of
0.733 for the own-weight, 0.069 for the Thai weight, and 0.167 for the American weight.
The subjects appear to account for different group accuracies across questions. For all three
types of questions, as captured by the coefficients on Accq, subjects put significantly more
10One possibility is that there are spillovers across question types when subjects observe all answers for all three
types of questions. For example, a subject who sees an American who answers well for the Thailand question
may put more weight on that American for the US question. Testing for these generally produces insignificant
results, although for the sum question, there is a small and significant spillover effect. Details are available upon
request.
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weight on American information for those questions on which Americans perform relatively
better.
It may seem surprising that subjects are able to appreciate the accuracy of Americans
relative to Thais for different questions. That they do is less surprising when the individual
questions are considered. Thai students do much better relative to Americans for the tem-
perature in Bangkok than they do for female-labor force participation in Thailand. It is not
unreasonable for a Thai student to think that it takes individual experience in Bangkok to know
the weather there, but that there is some general knowledge, that Americans may have as well
as Thais, involved in answering the labor-force question. Therefore, the Thai subjects may and
apparently do put higher relative weight on Thai information for the question about Bangkok
weather.
1.5.3 Special groups
Large samples
The predictions of a statistically optimizing model of behavior and actual behavior are likely
to deviate from each other as subjects observe increasing amounts of information, even if the
model applies for smaller amounts of observed answers. In the extreme case, as the number
of answers t hat a subject observes goes to infinity, the weight that a subject puts on her own
private signal should go to zero. In practice, this is not likely to be the case. One major reason
is the bounds to subjects' abilities to process information.
To see how larger samples could affect the way in which subjects use information, a treat-
ment group of 50 subjects saw samples of 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers for two
questions. 1l Table 6 describes the share of subjects who leave their initial answer unchanged.
For each type of question, subjects are significantly more likely to leave their initial answer
unchanged when they observe more information.
One explanation involves subjects throwing up their hands due to difficulties in processing
the observed information. Another possibility is that a subject who observes many answers is
more likely to observe two that bracket her own, which a subject interprets as confirming her
"These are questions 4 (high daily January temperature) and 8 (numbers of political leaders) in the
questionnaire.
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initial answer.
Anchoring
In this experiment, anchoring is potentially a major concern. Subjects may adhere more closely
to their initial answers because they have to express them. To test for this, a treatment group
of 42 students observed randomly selected answers from Americans and Thais without first
providing their private signals. If anchoring is present, subjects in this group should do better at
answering the questions than those in the main group. The students in the anchoring treatment
group will avoid the losses associated with anchoring to their initially expressed answer.
To test for this, I consider the following specification:
(Yiq - Truthq) 2 = l1Anchori + f22v ersioniv + Uiq , (1.24)
where Anchori is a dummy that is one if the subject is in the anchoring control group and zero
otherwise. Versioniv is a dummy that is one if subject i observed version v of the information
out of the 20 that were used. If subjects suffer losses from anchoring, 1 should be negative, so
that subjects who do not have the opportunity to adhere to their stated answer achieve lower
distances from the correct answer. Table 7 shows that this is the case, but not significantly so.
It is also possible to look at anchoring directly by comparing how close subjects' final answers
are to the information they observe. If subjects anchor to their private signals when they reveal
them, the subjects who do not reveal their private signals will choose final answers closer to
the answers they observe.
To test for this, I consider the following regressions:
(Yiq - ZiTq)2 = -- Anchori + 'vVersioniv + uiq (1.25)
(Yiq - ZiAq)2 = -lAnchori + /3 Versioniv + u !q
Anchoring would imply that /3 < 0 and ' < 0. Table 8 shows that this generally appears to
be the case, although never significantly so. The last column shows the average mean-squared
distance (from the observed Thai or American average) for the main group and this puts the
regression coefficients in perspective.
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For example, subjects in the main group choose final answers that are 1.835 standard de-
viations from the observed Thai average for the US question. The regression estimates that
the students in the anchoring group who observe both kinds of answers choose final answers
that are 0.051 standard deviations closer to the observed Thai average than the main group.
In general, the estimated coefficients follow this pattern. The data shows that anchoring has a
small and generally insignificant effect on subject behavior.
1.6 Tests for optimal behavior
1.6.1 Estimated optimal weights
Without any parametric assumptions, it is possible to estimate the optimal weights a subject
should use by simply regressing the correct answer on a subject's initial answer, the average
of the American answers she observes, and the average of the Thai answers she observes. The
regression equation (1.13) in Section 3.3 expressed this idea. As was the case with the estimated
actual weights from (1.18), these regressions can also be expanded to include terms with niA,
niT, and Accq.Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C show the results.
The first column of each table captures the primary results. For the Bangkok/Thailand
questions, an optimally-behaving subject would put a weight of 0.295 on her private belief, a
weight of 0.458 on the observed Thai average, and a weight of 0.247 on the observed American
average. For the Boston/US questions, the corresponding weights are 0.063, 0.115, and 0.822.
For the sum questions, the regression estimates that a subject should choose 0.180 for the self
weight, 0.250 for the weight given to observed Thai answers, and 0.570 for the weight given
to observed American answers. Notice that these regression estimates of optimal behavior do
not account for overconfidence. These are the weights that a subject should use assuming
overconfidence is not present.
The optimal weights subjects should use can also be estimated using the econometric model
described in Section 3. These estimates come from substituting the estimates of the American-
to-Thai MSEI ratio, the American group bias share, and the Thai group bias share into equations
(1.9) and (1.11). The estimates of these parameters were reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Tables 5A, 5B, and 5C display the main results about the actual behavior and the two sets
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of optimal estimates to three comparable tables. Table 5C displays the econometric model's
estimates of the optimal weights subjects should apply. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, a
subject should apply a weight of 0.258 to her initial answer, 0.459 to the Thai average she sees,
and 0.283 to the American average she sees. For the Boston/US questions, the corresponding
weights are 0.100, 0.174, and 0.726. For the sum questions, the model estimates that a subject
would optimally choose 0.155 for the self-weight, 0.333 for the weight given to observed Thai
answers, and 0.512 for the weight given to observed American answers. Confidence intervals for
these estimates are obtained by bootstrapping.
For all three types of questions, equality between the regression's estimates and the econo-
metric model's estimates of optimal behavior cannot be rejected. The close correspondence
between the optimal weight estimates obtained with the regression and those that come from
the econometric model provides additional evidence supporting the importance of accounting
for group bias in determining optimal behavior. If, in the model, the group bias shares are
assumed to be zero, the hypothesis of equality between the two sets of estimates of optimal
behavior is rejected for each of the three types of questions.
1.6.2 Construction of confidence intervals
Confidence intervals can be constructed for the actual, naive, and optimal weight ratios. The
actual weight ratio is estimated from subject behavior, as described in Section 5. The naive
weight ratio expresses the relative weight a subject would use if she understood each group's
accuracy and ignored group bias. The optimal weight ratio expresses the relative weight that
a subject would use if she correctly perceived each group's accuracy and accounted for group
bias.
Weight ratios:
Estimated = 
IT
Naive = 2
A actual
Optimal = 1 + (nT -1) (PT)actualual T
A2 tu (l+(nA - 1) (PA)actual)(1 - (PT)actual) IA actual( -1(Aat )1--
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The confidence intervals for the optimal weight ratios are calculated for a variety of different
values of the overconfidence parameter c. The optimal weight ratio increases as subjects have
more overconfidence. More overconfident subjects believe they have a lower error variance
relative to both Thais and Americans, but they also believe more in their reading of the shared
Thai information about a question. This means that overconfidence has a larger negative
effect on the weight subjects put on observed Thai information than on observed American
information.
Even for very large overconfidence (small c), though, the direct effect of group bias on
the optimal weight ratio is larger than the effect of overconfidence. Consider the Boston/US
questions. With no overconfidence (c = 1), the group bias share causes the optimal weight ratio
to be 4.423, compared to the naive weight ratio of 3.086. Increasing overconfidence by lowering
c to 0.25 only causes the optimal weight ratio to rise to 5.125.
The data can also be used to estimate the overconfidence parameter with some additional
assumptions. Specifically, for each of the question types, if it is assumed that PA = PT and
c is allowed to be a function of niA + niT, the overconfidence parameters c(niA + niT) can be
estimated. Table 9 reports these results. The standard error bounds for the overconfidence
estimates are large. Estimated overconfidence generally increases when more information is
observed, but it is present for any amount of information. The estimated c values are used only
for illustrative purposes in the calculation of the optimal American-to-Thai weight ratios.
1.6.3 A test for naive behavior
The experimental data can be used to test hypotheses about how subjects perceive the relative
accuracy and group biases of Americans and Thais. Specifically, consider the hypothesis of
naive behavior, No:
No: AT (4)
A2perceived act2 al (PT)perceived = O, (PA)perceived = 
This hypothesis states that subjects correctly perceive the MSE of Thais relative to Americans,
but ignore group bias. Under No, subjects understand how accurate each group is, but fail to
value the independence in American information.
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Under No, subjects will choose
/)T (/A actual (1.26)
A test of No is a test of (1.26), equality between the actual weight ratio that subjects use and
the naive weight ratio.
The second row of Table 10 displays the results of this test for all three types of questions.
Confidence intervals for the actual weight ratios are calculated by bootstrapping the estimated
regression coefficients using the estimated variance-covariance matrix. For the Bangkok/Thailand
questions and the sum questions, we can reject this hypothesis at the 5% level (p = 0 and
p = 0.017, respectively). For the Boston/US questions, we can reject it at the 10% level
(p = 0.058). The hypothesis is rejected for the Bangkok questions due to subjects choos-
ing too low a weight for American answers relative to Thai answers. It is rejected for the
Boston/US and sum questions due to subjects relatively overweighing American answers. For
all three types of questions, by looking at how subjects weigh the American answers they see
compared to the Thai answers they see, it can be rejected that subjects correctly perceive how
accurate Americans are relative to Thais while at the same time failing to recognize the presence
of group bias.
Now consider the hypothesis of sophisticated behavior, So:
So0 (2 A 2 I ) (PT)perceived = (PT)actual (PA)perceived = (PA)actual
A perceived At actual
This hypothesis states that subjects correctly perceive the MSE of Thais relative to Americans,
and also correctly account for group bias. Under So, subjects understand how accurate each
group is and correctly value the independence in American information. Compared to a subject
who behaves according to No, a subject who behaves according to So will put more weight on
American answers because she appreciates the value of an American's independent perspective.
Under So, subjects will choose the optimal weight ratio
3 A = tA ( 1 + (nT - 1) (PT)actual -C (PT)actual (.27
T kAJ actual (1 + (nA- 1) (PA)actual)(1 - (PT)actual))P~T A actual 
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A test of So is a test of (1.27), equality between the relative weight ratio that subjects use and
the optimal weight ratio.
Table 10 displays the results of this test for a variety of possible values of the overconfidence
parameter. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, we reject So. For all values of overconfidence,
the p-value of the test is zero or nearly zero. Thais appear to put too little weight on American
answers in this case.
On the other hand, for the Boston/US and sum questions, this hypothesis is not rejected
for any level of overconfidence. For c = 1, the optimal weight ratio estimates are 4.423 and
1.843, compared to the actual weight ratio estimates of 5.065 and 2.420. The p-values for the
two tests of equality are 0.610 and 0.367, respectively.
Given estimated overconfidence, the actual and optimal weight ratios match up remarkably
closely in these two cases. For the Boston/US questions, the optimal weight ratio estimate is
5.043 and the actual weight ratio estimate is 5.065. The p-value for equality between the two
is (not surprisingly) nearly one (p = 0.963). For the sum questions, the actual weight ratio
estimate is 2.420, compared to the optimal estimate of 2.168, giving a p-value of 0.721 in the
equality test;. If individuals are overconfident, but still appreciate both how accurate Americans
are relative to other Thais and the extent of group bias, they will use relative weight ratios that
are very close to those actually used by the experimental subjects.
Still, the subject behavior described to this point for the Boston/US and sum questions can
also be explained by a hypothesis of biased behavior, Bo:
Bo- 2 )2 , (PT)perceived = o, (PA)perceived= 0
A perceived A actual
Under Bo, subjects perceive Americans to be better than they actually are compared to Thais
and they ignore group bias.
The experimental design makes it possible to distinguish between So and Bo. The following
subsection shows how the special nature of the sum question permits a test of the hypothesis
that subjects ignore the group effect for any value of (A) making it possible to
etween these xplanations of subjecperceived
distinguish between these explanations of subject behavior.
35
1.6.4 A test for sophisticated behavior
By looking at how subjects who observe answers only for the sum question update their answers
for both the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions, it is possible to test the hypothesis
that subjects ignore group bias when choosing their final answers. To derive this test, it is
necessary to expand the earlier notation which applied when each question type was considered
separately.
Define
Pjk = group bias share in total MSE for group j for question type k
A2k = mean-squared error for group j for question type k .
For example, PTa is the group bias share for Thais for the Boston/US questions.
Consider the case when a subject uses observed answers for the sum question to up-
date her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand question. A subject updates her answer for the
Bangkok/Thailand question based on her initial answer for the Bangkok/Thailand question and
the distance between the answers she observes for the sum question and her initial answer for the
sum question. When a subject observes answers above her own for the sum question and uses
them to update her answer, she is likely to revise upwards her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand
question.
Her expected mean-squared prediction error is
E(MSE) = E (tT ((XTs - is) + ... + (XTnT - is)) + qA ((XAsl - s) + ... + (XAsnA - is)) + Xit - t)
= E T Z(ETtk + ETak) + A (EAtk+ EAak) - (nTT + nAA)(Eit + ia) + Eit
k=l k=l
= 2TT2 [(Tt + a) + (T - 1)(PTt + PTa )] + ALA[At + Aa + (nA - 1)(PAt At +I
(1 - nTOT - nAOA)2, aTt+ + (nTT + nAA + 2(1 - nT -AA)TTPTTt
-
2 (nTqT + nAqA)nTTO'TaA a ,
where bA is the weight given to American answers for the sum question and bT is the weight
given to other Thai answers for the sum question.
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Taking the derivatives with respect to OA and T gives the optimal weights. The optimal
weight ratio A can be expressed as a function of the earlier optimal weight ratios: ( Th
and ( A . The first of these is the optimal weight ratio for the Thai questions when subjects
observe answers for the Thai questions, and the second is the optimal weight ratio for the US
questions when subjects observe information for the US questions. The optimal weight ratio
for the Thai question when answers are observed for the sum question only is
_ ) a+ (A )UYA + CnTlTa(PTtPTa)(1-PTa)
OA(~ ) AT Thai ~ US(~ 1T~ Y(1.28)
OT Thai 1 + YA 1--pTt + CnTATa(PTa-PTt)
YT 1-PTa YT
where
YA = (1 + (nA - 1)PAa)(1 -PTa)
YT = ( (nA - 1)PAt)(1- PTt)
If the perceived group bias shares for Thais for the Thailand and US questions, PTt and
PTa, are zero, this reduces to the following simple expression
2t + A2a
"Tt Ta T, (1.29)(ST ) Thai At Aa (1.29)
This means that
(PTt)perceived = (PTa)perceived = = O (1.30)
Thai OJT/ US
This gives a test for the hypothesis, Io, that the perceived group bias shares are zero.
IO : (PTt)perceived = (PTa)perceived 0
This hypothesis states that subjects ignore group bias for Thais for the Thai and US questions.
Notice that I0 encompasses No, the hypothesis that subjects perceive total MSE correctly and
ignore group bias, and Bo, the hypothesis that subjects perceive Americans to have lower MSE
relative to Thais than they actually do and that subjects ignore group bias. Rejection of Io
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means Bo must also be rejected.
Under Io, subjects will choose
( OA) = ()A u
VT Thai VT US
This test of I is a test of the equality between the weight ratio subjects use to relatively weight
American answers for the sum question compared to Thai answers when they update for the
Thai question and the analogous ratio when they update for the US question.
The following two regressions give the estimates OA,Thai, T,Thai, OA,US1 and 5T,US needed
to test I. The first equation expresses the change in a subject's answer for the Thai question
(subscript t) as a function of the distance between the average observed American answer for
the sum question and her own answer for the sum question (subscript s) and the distance
between the average observed Thai answer for the sum question and her own answer for the
sum question.
yiqt - Xiqt = OAA(iAqs - Xiqs) + C)T(iTqs - Xiqs) + Eiqt (1.31)
Yiqa - Xiqa = A(iAqs - Xiqs) + ST(iTqs - Xiqs) + -iqa (1.32)
Table 11 reports the results from estimating equations (1.31) and (1.32). Notice that
( XTA) T .07 1.32 and ) -. 225= 2.78. We can reject Io at a 10% level (p = 0.088).qST Thai - .057 O-qT US .081
At a 10% level, it is possible to reject that subjects fail to take group bias into account, regardless
of their perceptions American relative accurac compared to Thais.
In contrast, accounting for group bias would lead to a pattern for the optimal weights similar
to that seen in the data for the actual weights. If the perceived group bias share for Thais for
the Boston/US questions (PTa) is greater than the perceived group bias share for Thais for the
Bangkok/Thailand questions (PTt), then subjects will put a higher relative weight on observed
Americans for the US questions than for the Thailand questions.
PTa > PTt = Thai U <
To understand Thai Ther answer US
To understand the intuition, consider a subject updating her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand
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question after observing answers for the sum question. If PTt is high, she should put less weight
on Thais relative to Americans for the same reasons seen earlier; group bias means there is less
new information in each additional Thai answer. On the other hand, if PTa is high, she should
put higher weight on observed Thai answers for the sum question. When PTa is high, Thai
subjects have a better idea of what other Thai answers about the sum mean for what those
observed students believe about the Thai question. For example, if PTa was one, a subject could
deduce the observed individual's private signal about the Thai question from her answer to the
sum question.
Can the effects of group bias be large enough to replicate the pattern seen in the data? The
answer is yes. If subjects applied the estimated actual variance estimates and estimated actual
group bias shares, they would choose (A) = 1.51 and (A) = 2.53. Figure 3 shows
XT Thai XT US
how the optimal weight ratios for the two types of questions vary as a function of PTa, holding
the other parameters constant at their estimated values.
The results in the previous section that showed subjects used approximately the optimal
weight ratio for the Boston/US and sum questions could have been explained by either subjects
appreciating the importance of group bias or by subjects overestimating A for those ques-
tions. By looking at how subjects update separately for the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US
questions when they observe answers for the sum, it is possible to reject the latter possibility.
On the other hand, the actual behavior seen in the data fits closely with subjects appreciating
the fact that; a bigger share of their error will be attributable to the group for the Boston/US
questions than for the Bangkok/Thailand questions.
1.7 Potential gains from changing behavior
Described here are comparisons of the mean-squared error that subjects actually achieve with
their initial and final answers and what they could have optimally achieved. Then, I compare
how well subjects could have done using different subsets of the information provided to them.
Finally, I show that the subjects could primarily improve their performance not by changing
how they weigh observed American answers relative to observed Thai answers, but from how
they weigh the initial answers they give before observing answers given by other students.
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1.7.1 Improvements achieved by subjects
Regressions parallel to (1.13) provide direct estimates of the decreases in MSE that subjects
achieve by incorporating the information that they observe. These improvements can be com-
pared to what subjects could have achieved had they used information optimally. The mean-
squared distance from the truth achieved by using the optimal weights from regression (1.13)
is given by
MSD(1.13) = (Truthq - Truthq)2
This optimal MSE can be compared to:
1) The mean-squared distance between the truth and subjects' initial answers, Xisq, and
2) The mean-squared distance between the truth and subjects' final answers after observing
Thai and American answers, Yiq-
The first two rows of Table 12 report these measures. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions,
the MSE of subjects' initial answers is 2.2 times greater than the MSE that subjects could have
achieved by optimally using all observed answers. Subjects could achieve an improvement of
1.2 by this measure. With their initial answers, subjects attain a MSE that is 5.5 times greater
than optimal for the questions about the US. When observing answers for the sum question,
subjects attain an MSE that is 1.6 times greater than optimal for the Thai question and 2.0
times greater than optimal for the US question. Significantly smaller gains are attainable when
subjects do not observe direct information.
With their actual forecasts, Yiq, subjects achieve significant gains by using the information
that they observe. Subjects achieve MSEs of 1.8 and 3.1, for the Bangkok/Thailand and
Boston/US questions when observing direct information. They achieve MSEs of 1.4 and 1.8
when observing answers for the sum question. When they observe direct information, subjects
achieve 32% of the possible improvement over their initial answers for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions and 54% of the possible improvement for the Boston/US questions. When they
observe answers for the sum question, subjects achieve 33% of the possible improvement over
their initial answers for the Bangkok/Thailand questions and 21% of the possible improvement
for the Boston/US questions.
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1.7.2 Estimating the value of each group's information
Estimating how valuable the American (Thai) information is to a Thai subject entails comparing
the MSE that could have been achieved using only the observed American (Thai) answers and
a subject's private signal. Each of the following measures is compared to the MSE that could
have been achieved by optimally using all observed information:
1) The MSE that could be achieved by optimally using only the observed Thai answers.
This can be estimated from the regression equation:
Truthq = s zisq + 0TZiTq + iq
2) The MSE that could be achieved by optimally using only the observed American answers.
This can be estimated from the regression equation:
Truthq = (Cs Zisq + PAZiAq + Eiq
The third row of Table 12 shows the MSEs that subjects could achieve by using just the
Thai information and their own initial answers. Relative to the optimal MSE, when observing
direct information, subjects could achieve MSE reductions of 83% for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions ad 50% for the Boston/US questions. When they observe answers for the sum
question, the potential improvements attainable by using only the observed Thai answers are
52% and 70% over subjects' initial answers.
The last row of Table 12 shows that, with just the observed American answers, subjects
could achieve most of the possible improvement when they observe answers for the Boston/US
and sum questions. The potential improvements using only American information are 72% for
the Bangkok/Thailand questions and 98% for the Boston/US questions when they observe
direct information. They could attain improvements of 93% and 87% when observing answers
for the sum question.
Of note is the extra value in American answers compared to Thai answers for the sum
question. WVhen subjects see answers for the sum question only, they can achieve about 90%
of the improvement possible with the American answers alone. Since Americans and Thais
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have nearly equal MSEs for the sum question, it is primarily group bias that drives this. The
independence of American information makes it relatively more valuable to a Thai than more
Thai information.
1.7.3 Gains attainable by reducing overconfidence
Inspection of the estimated optimal weights and the estimated actual weights seems to indicate
that the costs of overconfidence are much higher than the costs of overweighing or underweighing
observed Thai information relative to observed American information. This can be shown
directly by estimating how much could be gained if subjects optimally chose 0,, both in terms
of subjects reducing their MSE and increasing their prize money.
To make these calculations, first consider the mean-squared error when the estimated actual
weights are used. Equation (1.18) is estimated to obtain jYq, A, T, and pi.
Yiq = PAZiAq + TZiTq + PsZiq + Eiq
The first row in Table 13 shows the MSE (relative to optimal) that subjects would attain by
choosing yq.12
To estimate the loss that comes from choosing a non-optimal As, equation (1.13) is estimated
Truthq = cAXiAq + WTXiTq + SPsXisq + &iq,
under the restriction TA =- fT This gives the mean-squared distance that could be achieved
if subjects optimally chose W,, given the estimated actual relative weighting applied to observed
American compared to observed Thai information. Table 13 describes how subjects could
improve their MSE by changing how they weigh themselves. Table 14 describes potential
improvements in prize money.
The tables show that, when subjects observe answers for the Bangkok/Thailand questions,
they can achieve 95% of the possible MSE reduction and 90% of the possible prize money
increase by correctly choosing p,. When subjects observe answers for the Boston/US questions,
12Note that the attained MSE is higher than the second row of Table 12, because yi' does not contain the
variation induced by the error term.
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they can achieve 99% of the possible MSE reduction and 94% of the possible prize money
increase by choosing the optimal self-weight. When subjects see answers for the sum question,
the results again show that most of the potential gains come from subjects changing how weigh
their original answers. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects can achieve 97% of the
possible MSE reduction and 79% of the possible prize money increase by optimally choosing
po5 . For the Boston/US questions, optimally choosing ps achieves 99% of the possible MSE
reduction and 70% of the possible prize money increase.
For each of the three types of questions, subjects could improve their performances much
more by decreasing their overconfidence than they could by changing how they relatively weigh
observed American and Thai answers. Given the nearly optimal relative weights that subjects
choose for the US and sum questions, this is not surprising.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how people in developing
countries respond to different kinds of information. For questions that do not specifically refer
to Bangkok or Thailand, the experimental subjects apply the optimal relative weights to the
American and Thai information they observe. I find that, in achieving this optimality, the Thai
students in the experiment show a remarkable sophistication in assessing the relative value
of observed American information compared to observed domestic information. Specifically,
the results show that the Thai students appreciate the extra value in American information
due to its independence. They achieve this cognitive success despite displaying considerable
overconfidence.
The experimental results in this paper have important implications for our understanding
of how agents conduct inference. Despite potential biases coming from salient ethnic labels,
the subjects in the experiment treat the information they observe in a sophisticated way. If
people in developing countries generally appreciate the value of observing independent sources of
information, ensuring access to a variety of information sources might help to change behaviors
affecting agricultural output and public health. However, the results suggest that overconfidence
will be a siginificant barrier to individuals appreciating the value of any information they
43
observe.
It is interesting that the subjects fail to use the optimal relative weights only for the questions
about Bangkok or Thailand. In this case, they overweigh observed Thais compared to observed
Americans. They should put a high weight on observed Thais compared to observed Americans,
but they choose an even higher relative weight than they optimally would. Future work could
investigate whether it is generally the case that agents overweigh other members of their own
group relative to outsiders specifically for tasks that refer to the group's presumed area of
expertise.
In addition, future research could apply this experiment to American students, to see if and
when they appreciate the value in the independence of Thai information. The experimental
results reported here show that the ethnic labels attached to information generally do not
interfere with Thai subjects making intelligent decisions in terms of weighing observed American
answers versus observed Thai answers. It would be interesting to see if we could come to the
same conclusion about American students.
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1 Appendix 1: The questionnaire
1) At the equator, the sun sets 12 hours after it rises on any day. In other places, the day
is longer than 12 hours in the summer and shorter than 12 hours in the winter.
Length of longest day in Length of longest day in Sum
Bangkok Boston
hours and + hours and = hours and
minutes minutes minutes
2)
Highest recorded Highest recorded Sum
temperature in Bangkok temperature in Boston in
in 2002 2002
OF + OF = OF
3)
From 1961-1990, From 1961-1990, Sum
average number of days average number of days
per year with recordable per year with recordable
precipitation (of any precipitation (of any
type) in Bangkok type) in Boston
days + days = days
4)
From 1961-1990, From 1961-1990, Sum
average daily high average daily high
temperature in January temperature in January in
in Bangkok Boston
OF + OF = F
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5) Distance between Bangkok and Boston =
6) The per capita gross national product (GNP) is a measure of the annual mean income
that is earned per person in a country. So per capita GNP is the total income of a country
divided by the total number of people in that country (including adults and children).
In 2002, per capita GNP In 2002, per capita GNP Sum
of Thailand (in US of US (in US dollars)
dollars)
$ + $ =$
7)
2002 population of 2002 population of US Sum
Thailand
million + million million
people people people
8)
Since January 1, 1960, Since January 1, 1960, Sum
number of Thai prime number of US presidents
ministers
9)
On October 1, 2003, On October 1, 2003, Sum
average price of a gallon average price of a gallon
of premium gasoline (95 of premium gasoline (95
octane) in Bangkok octane) in Boston
$.+ $. = $
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miles
10) The baht is the currency of Thailand. On January 1, 2003, what was the official Thai
baht-to-US dollar exchange rate? (Please give your answer by filling in the blank)
baht = $1
11)
In 2002, percentage of In 2002, percentage of Sum
Thai women aged 15-24 American women aged
who were infected with 15-24 who were infected
HIV with HIV
% + % %
12)
In 2000, percentage of In 2000, percentage of Sum
Thai workers who were American workers who
women (average for the were women (average for
year) the year)
% + % %
13)
In 2000, percentage of In 2000, percentage of Sum
Thais aged 25-29 with at Americans aged 25-29
least some university with at least some
education university education
% + % -%
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14)
In 2000, percentage of In 2000, percentage of Sum
Thai workers whose American workers whose
primary occupation was primary occupation was
in agriculture in agriculture
% + % %
15)
In 2000, percentage of In 2000, percentage of Sum
Thais who reported they Americans who reported
were of Chinese they were of African
ethnicity ethnicity
% + % = %
2 Appendix 2: Proof for Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Equation (14) is the MLE for pj under the model.
Proof. Consider group j (either A or T). For a given question q, it is clear that
jq = N (xijq - Truthq) 2 (Al)
is the MLE for the true mean-squared distance of group j answers from the truth, a2Tq. In the model,
the sample variance times N1 is (1 - p)a2Tq. It is thus clear that
1 N(1 Pq)0q = N (2ij -j) (A2)
is the MLE for the sample variance, where TTq is the average of the Thai answers for question q, and
pq contains the subscript to denote that the estimate of p is based on question q. Since the MLE of a
function is the function of the MLEs, we can separate (A2), and substitution of (Al) into (A2) gives
N
Z(xij, -jq)2
1-q = i=1
(xijq -Trthq) 2
i=1
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which leads to
N
(jq - Truth)2
Pq N 2
J(Xijq- Truthq) 2 q
i=1
Since the questions are assumed to be independent, the MLE for p is just the average of the
estimates provided by all the Q questions:
q1 q=1 
as was to be shown. E
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From 1961-1990, average From 1961-1990, average Sum
daily high temperature in daily high temperature in
January in Bangkok January in Boston
oC + C C= 
Answers given by Thai students
1. 23 °C
2. 20 °C
Answers given by American students
1. 2 °C
Figure 1: Sample of information shown to subjects
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Correct
Density for
US answers
IVI
;wers
0 50
High daily January temperature in Bangkok
Figure 2A: Kernel density estimates for high daily January
temperature in Bangkok (in °C)
Correct
[nswer=vC Density for
for
;wers
-10
High daily January temperature in Boston
Figure 2B: Kernel density estimates for high daily January
temperature in Boston (in C)
.091753 -
a,
0
0-
C
.064454
.7
,
0
0
Notes: (1) The Epanechnikov kernel is used with optimal bandwidth selection.
(2) Density estimates are estimated over different ranges in the Figures 2A and 2B.
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Figure 2C: Kernel density estimates for sum of high daily
January temperatures (in °C)
Note: (1) The Epanechnikov kernel is used with optimal bandwidth selection.
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Table 3A: Weights used when both types of information are seen (Thailand questions)
Dependent variable: Subjects' final answers for the Thailand questions
Regressor Questions about Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own prior (i.,) .654 .655 .651 .661
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.018)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (ils,2)
.002 .008 .004
(.019) (.019) (.019)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (s, 3 )
-.038 -.04
(.019) (.019)
Own prior*accuracy index (,4)
Thai average (fiT,,) .242 .245 .245 .243
(.02) (.021) (.025) (.026)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (T,2)
.002 .001 .011
(.024) (.024) (.025)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (T,3)
Thai average*accuracy index (6fi, 4)
US average (A,I)
.001 -.002
(.025) (.025)
.036
(.096)
.058 .05 .039 .063
(.012) (.014) (.015) (.016)
US average*number of observed
American answers (fA,2,)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (A,3) 
US average*accuracy index (A,4)
.979
1008N
-.016 0 -.003
(.017) (.019) (.019)
-.036 -.026
(.018) (.018)
.232
(.055)
.979 .979 .98
986 986 986
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) R-squared values are calculated using the data standardized by the standard
deviations only, and not the means.
(3) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(4) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
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-.142
(.084)
Table 3B: Weights used when both types of information are seen (US questions)
Dependent variable: Subjects' final answers for US questions
Regressor Questions about US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own prior (,5,,) .461
(.02)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (,2)
.477 .482 .493
(.02) (.021) (.021)
.002 0 .012
(.024) (.024) (.024)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (,3)
Own prior*accuracy index (,4)
Thai average (P,3)
.04 .044
(.024) (.024)
-.271
(.128)
.092
(.03)
.088 .056 .065
(.03) (.036) (.036)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (T,2)
-.016 -.005 .002
(.034) (.034) (.037)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (T,3)
Thai average*accuracy index (rT,4)
-.051 -.037
(.037) (.041)
-.116
(.219)
US average (PA, ) .466 .484
(.019) (.02)
.478 .458
(.02) (.021)
US average*number of observed
American answers (A),2)
.075 .089 .07
(.021) (.023) (.023)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (A,3)
US average*accuracy index (A,4)
R 2
N
.924
1053
-.046 -.053
(.024) (.024)
.387
(.124)
.926
1032
.926
1032
.927
1032
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) R-squared values are calculated using the data standardized by the standard
deviations only, and not the means.
(3) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(4) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
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Table 3C: Weights used when both types of information are seen (sum questions)
Dependent variable: Subjects' final answers for sum questions
Regressor Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.733 .733
(.019) (.02)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (s,2)
.733
(.02)
.731
(.02)
.001 -. 001 -.001
(.024) (.024) (.024)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (IBs,3)
-.002 .001
(.026) (.026)
Own prior*accuracy index (, 4 )
Thai average (fiT,I)
.261
(.13)
.069 .07 .063 .076
(.02) (.026) (.029) (.032)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (fiT,2)
.004 .009 .006
(.03) (.031) (.031)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (fiT,3)
Thai average*accuracy index (,4)
US average (HA,1)
US average*number of observed
American answers (A,2)
-.024 -.016
(.037) (.037)
-.151
(.204)
.167 .096 .091 .084
(.024) (.037) (.037) (.037)
-.068 -.067 -.06
(.031) (.031) (.032)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (A,3)
-. 023 -.011
(.024) (.025)
US average*accuracy index (A,4) .353
(.138)
.961 .963
N
.963 .963
557 548 548 548
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) R-squared values are calculated using the data standardized by the standard
deviations only, and not the means.
(3) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(4) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
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Own prior (,,)
Table 4A: MSE minimizing behavior when both types of answers are seen
Dependent variable: Correct answer for Thailand questions
Regressor Questions about Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.295 .293 .269 .286
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.019)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (rls, 2)
.035 .053 .033
(.024) (.024) (.021)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (s,3)
-. 113 -.115
(.024) (.02)
Own prior*accuracy index (S,4) -.902
(.086)
Thai average (T,I) .458 .435 .497 .403
(.023) (.023) (.025) (.023)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (,2)
-.145
(.029)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (fiT,3)
.183 .145
(.029) (.025)
Thai average*accuracy index (fiT,4) -.228
(.092)
.247 .272 .234
(.018) (.019) (.02)
US average*number of observed
American answers (A,2)
.311
(.018)
.11 .134 .118
(.024) (.026) (.022)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (fA,3)
-. 07 -.03
(.025) (.022)
US average*accuracy index (A,4)
N 1008
1.13
(.065)
986 986 986
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
(4) Regressions are esimtated under the constraints:
fs,1 + P,I +/ PI = 1 and s,j + T,,j + A,I = 0 for j > 1
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-.187
(.03)
-.151
(.026)
US average (fA,I)
Own prior (,8,,)
Table 4B: MSE minimizing behavior when both types of answers are seen
Dependent variable: Correct answer for US questions
Regressor Questions about US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.063 .056 .04 .083
(.017) (.017) (.018) (.014)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (s,2)
-.056 -.048 -.029
(.019) (.019) (.016)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (s,. 3 )
Own prior*accuracy index (s, 4 )
-.08
(.02)
-.095
(.016)
-.755
(.083)
Thai average (fiT,) .115
(.02)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (T,2)
.075
(.02)
.089 .153
(.021) (.017)
-.137 -.135 -.056
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (fiT,3)
Thai average*accuracy index (fiT,4)
US average (fA,1)
.036 .119
(.022) (.018)
-1.402
(.1)
.822 .869 .871 .764
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.014)
US average*number of observed
American answers (fi4, 2 )
.193 .183 .085
(.019) (.019) (.015)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (A,3)
US average*accuracy index ( ,4)
N 1053
.043 -.024
(.019) (.015)
2.157
(.082)
1032 1032 1032
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
(4) Regressions are esimtated under the constraints:
s, + + , + A, = 1 and s j + AT,i j + ,A,j = 0 for j > 1
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Table 4C: MSE minimizing behavior when both types of answers are seen
Dependent variable: Correct answer for sum questions
Regressor Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.18 .148 .152 .14
(.026) (.028) (.03) (.022)
Own prior*number of observed
American answers (,2)
-.117 -.118 -.121
(.034) (.034) (.025)
Own prior*number of observed
Thai answers (s,3)
.018 -.045
(.036) (.027)
Own prior*accuracy index (s,A) -.525
(.133)
Thai average (fiT,I) .25 .249 .247 .396
(.024) (.032) (.035) (.027)
Thai average*number of observed
American answers (T,2)
.036 .037 .022
(.035) (.035) (.026)
Thai average*number of observed
Thai answers (T,3)
-. 006 0
(.036) (.027)
Thai average*accuracy index (,n4)
US average (A,1) .57 .603 .602 .464
(.026) (.037) (.038) (.03)
US average*number of observed
American answers (A,2)
.081 .081
(.033) (.033)
US average*number of observed
Thai answers (A,3)
.098
(.025)
-.012 .045
(.031) (.023)
US average*accuracy index (A,4)
N
2.838
(.14)
557 548 548 548
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
(meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
(4) Regressions are esimtated under the constraints:
s,l + /3T, + A,I = 1 and Pls,j + T, +PA,j = 0 for j > 1
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-2.314
(.154)
Own prior (ls,,)
Table 5A: Estimated actual weights when both types of information are seen
Actual weight Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Own prior .654 .461 .733
(.016) (.02) (.019)
Thai average .242 .092 .069
(.02) (.03) (.02)
US average .058 .466 .167
(.012) (.019) (.024)
N 1008 1053 557
Note:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the regressions in column 1 in Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C.
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Table 5B: Optimal weights estimated from reduced form regression
Optimal weight Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3)
Own prior .295 .063 .18
(.021) (.017) (.026)
Thai average .458 .115 .25
(.023) (.02) (.024)
American average .247 .822 .57
(.018) (.016) (.026)
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the regressions in column 1 in Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C.
Table 5C: Optimal weights estimated from econometric model (given c = 1 )
Optimal weight Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3)
Own prior 0.258 0.100 0.155
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Thai average 0.459 0.174 0.333
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
American average 0.283 0.726 0.512
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
Notes:
(1) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the parameter estimates described in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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Table 8: Effect of anchoring on distance from observed information
Independent variable: Dummy for anchoring treatment group
Only Thai Only American
Dependent variable All observations answers seen answers seen
(1) (2) (3)
Questions about Thailand
Squared distance from average of
observed Thai answers
Squared distance from average of
observed American answers
-.014
(.021)
N=1561
-.014
(.041)
N=429
.043
(.079)
N=1510
-.043
(.129)
N=378
Questions about US
Squared distance from average of
observed Thai answers
Squared distance from average of
observed American answers
-.051
(.065)
N=1563
-.161
(.087)
N=378
-.046
(.022)
N=1566
.013
(.013)
N=381
Questions about sum
Squared distance from average of
observed Thai answers
Squared distance from average of
observed American answers
-.026
(.049)
N=1555
-.123
(.079)
N=346
-.049
(.07)
N=1644
-.184
(.097)
N=435
Average squared
distance for subjects
in main group
(4)
.832
(1.778)
N=1358
1.727
(2.584)
N=1314
1.798
(3.23)
N=1360
1.378
(2.945)
N=1360
1.75
(3.585)
N=1353
1.781
(3.314)
N=1433
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Note:
(1) For columns (1), (2) and (3) robust regression standard errors are reported in parentheses.
For column (4), the standard deviation is in parentheses.
Table 9: NLS estimate of overconfidence and perceived correlation
2
Non-linear regressions with A2 estimated as an endogenous parameter.
Parameter Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
c(nA + nT = 2) .657
(.17)
C(nA + nT = 3) .233
(.145)
c(nA + nT = 4) .582
(.207)
C(nA + nT = 5) .484
(.231)
c(nA + nT = 6) .387
(.225)
PA = PT .526
(.314)
2AT .168
A2 (.045)
R 2 .98
N 986
.465
(.339)
.308
(.234)
.412
(.284)
.301
(.205)
.189
(.129)
.722
(.277)
6.161
(1.871)
.925
1032
.359
(.379)
.16
(.184)
.244
(.277)
.211
(.241)
.11
(.14)
.573
(.484)
1.236
(.311)
.961
548
68
Notes: (1) Non-linear regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) Regressions are estimated under the assumption that the perceived Thai and American
correlation coefficients are equal.
Table 10: Comparing the weight ratios
Estimated American-to-Thai weight ratio
Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Actual weight ratio
90% confidence interval
95% confidence interval
Naive weight ratio
.240
(.150,.334)
(.139,.351)
.517
(.477,.554)
p=O.000
5.065
(3.420,11.385)
(3.118,14.232)
3.086
(2.737,3.577)
p=0.058
2.420
(1.601,4.501)
(1.461,5.577)
1.299
(1.205,1.406)
p=0.0 17
Optimal weight ratios for
different overconfidence levels
c=l
c = 0.75
c = 0.5
c = 0.25
.571
(.475,.694)
p=O.001
.576
(.464,.727)
p=O.001
.606
(.476,.759)
p=O.000
.616
(.468,.798)
p=O.000
Estimated C(nA + nT) .603
(.476,.773)
p=0.0 02
4.423
(3.467,5.63)
p=0.610
4.581
(3.504,6.29)
p=O. 750
4.897
(3.62,6.938)
p=0.888
5.125
(3.662,7.592)
p=0.976
5.043
(3.635,7.345)
p=0.963
1.843
(1.466,2.332)
p=0.367
1.913
(1.469,2.524)
p=0.45 7
2.048
(1.549,2.877)
p=O. 600
2.135
(1.525,2.991)
p=O. 70 9
2.168
(1.597,3.136)
p=O. 721
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Notes: (1) Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.
(2) The bootstrap for the actual weights accounts for correlation in the coefficient estimates.
(3) p -values compare the given weight ratio to the actual weight ratio.
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Chapter 2
Is There an Information Endowment
Effect?
Summary 2 This paper reports the results of an experiment in which subjects were endowed
with information that could help them to answer a series of general-knowledge questions. Ex-
perimental evidence suggests that there is an endowment effect for goods. On average, an
individual who is endowed with a coffee mug or chocolate bar demands a much higher price to
sell than an unendowed person is willing to pay to acquire the same good. This study shows
that a similar phenomenon does not exist when the endowment consists of information rather
than goods. The results suggest that the endowment effect operates primarily on preferences as
opposed to judgment. Subjects in the experiment appear not to open separate mental accounts
for monetary rewards and the endowed information.
2.1 Introduction
Experimental evidence indicates that, for a range of consumption goods, individuals generally
demand a higher price for selling a good with which they are endowed than they would be
willing to pay to acquire the same good (Knetsch (1989), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
(1990), List (2003)). This behavioral anomaly has been termed the endowment effect (Thaler
(1980)). The implications of consumption endowment effects are far-reaching. For example,
endowment effects cause the Coase Theorem to no longer hold, invalidating neoclassical welfare
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economics (Kahneman (1979)). Given the profound implications of endowment effects for
goods, it is important to understand what causes endowment to affect behavior. It appears
that agents open separate accounts for different goods and for money, causing them to demand
higher selling prices and to be reluctant to trade endowed goods for unendowed goods. This
paper reports the results of an experiment that endows subjects with items that are valuable but
cannot be consumed. The experimental design makes it possible to see whether the endowment
effect causes agents to open a separate account when the endowment consists of information
rather than goods.
The endowment effect is a specific example of the more general phenomenon of loss aversion.
Empirical examples of loss aversion include an unwillingness of real estate and stock market
investors to sell assets for less than they paid for them (Genesove and Mayer (2001), Odean
(1998)). In this case, the loss aversion reflects the fact that agents maintain separate mental
accounts for different assets...
In the experiment, students at Loyola Marymount University first answered general knowl-
edge questions about past temperature and recent gas prices in Bangkok and Boston. In
separate research (Healy (2004)), I asked the same questions to 130 students at Thammasat
University (a top-ranked university in Bangkok) and 116 MIT students. Information endow-
ments were sealed envelopes containing summary statistics about how the Thammasat and MIT
students had answered the questions. In one experimental treatment, subjects were endowed
either with summary statistics about MIT students' opinions for the temperature in Boston
(question 1) or gas prices in Boston (question 2). Subjects who were endowed with informa-
tion pertaining to question 1 (question 2) were given the opportunity to trade for information
pertaining to question 2 (question 1), before they observed the information contained in an
envelope. After trading, subjects observed the information in their possession and they were
given the opportunity to revise their answers. The trading data provides evidence against the
presence of an information endowment effect. Of the 84 subjects, 43 (51%) traded. This is a
stark contrast with previous research that has looked at goods such as chocolate bars or mugs,
which find that 85%-90% of subjects choose to keep their endowed good.
To provide additional evidence about the presence or absence of information endowment
effects, the same subjects also participated in a second treatment in which they were given the
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opportunity to buy and sell information pertaining to the questions about Bangkok. Subjects
were either endowed with summary statistics about Thammasat students' opinions about the
temperature in Bangkok (question 3) or gas prices in Thailand (question 4). The experimental
design elicited from subjects endowed with information about question 3 (question 4) the price
at which they were willing to sell their endowment and the price at which they were willing
to buy information about question 4 (question 3). This design allows me to see if subjects
put a higher value on information because it is part of their endowment.1 In keeping with the
trading results, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that a subject's valuations of information
are not affected by whether that information is part of her endowment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe the first part of
the experimental design, which involved a simple trading experiment, and the results. Section
III describes the experimental design and results relating to the treatments that elicited the
monetary values that subjects attached to endowed information relative to other information.
In Section IV, I discuss the results' implications for our understanding of consumption endow-
ment effects and describe evidence confirming the efficiency of the information market in the
experiment. Section V concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design I
2.2.1 The questions
To test for an information endowment effect, I follow a design similar to that employed in papers
that have tested for a consumption endowment effect (Knetsch (1989), Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler (1990), and List (2003)). These papers test for an endowment effect by employing
two treatments. Subjects are endowed with a good in one treatment and a different good in the
other. My design differs from previous efforts in that subjects are endowed with information
that can help them answer a series of questions.
To start the experiment, each subject took a seat at a study carrel that contained a sealed
'An endowment effect could arise either because subjects undervalue goods or information that is not part of
the endowment or because the endowment is overvalued. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) and List (2003)
present evidence suggesting that the endowment effect arises primarily through inflated WTA values rather than
depressed WTP values.
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manila envelope that they were instructed not to open.2 Like List's (2003) procedure when
providing goods endowment, the subjects were given the manila envelopes at the start of the
experiment, so as to maximize the time that subjects possessed their endowments before making
decisions. Subjects were not informed of the envelopes' contents. Each of the six experimental
sessions had fourteen students. Subjects were told that they would be answering some general-
knowledge questions about Boston and Bangkok and that they would receive payment for each
question on which their answer was among the five closest to the correct answer. They then
answered the following four questions:
Question 1: From 1961-90, what was the average high daily temperature in Boston?
Question 2: On October 1, 2003, what was the average price of a gallon of premium gasoline in Boston?
Question 3: From 1961-90, what was the average high daily temperature in Bangkok?
Question 4: On October 1, 2003, what was the average price of a gallon of premium gasoline in Bangkok?
The subjects answered each question without knowing the contents of the manila envelopes
that they had been given. Their answers were collected before proceeding to the two kinds of
treatments: 1) treatments that involved trading of information, and 2) treatments that involved
auctions where subjects had the opportunity to buy and sell information.
2.2.2 Information trading
After handing in their answers to the four questions, subjects were told that their manila
envelopes contained information that could help them to answer the questions. Each envelope
contained two smaller sealed envelopes, one that pertained to a question about Boston and
another that; pertained to a question about Bangkok. Subjects were told to leave the envelope
pertaining to the Bangkok question in the manila envelope and to put the envelope that had
information pertaining to the Boston question onto the desk in front of them. Half of the
subjects were endowed with envelopes that pertained to question 1 and the other half were
2The full set of experimental instructions are available from the author upon request.
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Part 2
Figure 2-1: Envelope containing information pertaining to question 1
endowed with envelopes that pertained to question 2. Three sessions of 14 subjects each were
endowed with information about temperature and the other three sessions of 14 subjects each
were endowed with information about gas prices.
Each envelope contained the median answer given by 116 MIT students who answered either
question 1 or question 2. Subjects were told about the university where this data was collected
as well as the date of collection. For example, the subjects who were endowed with information
about question 1 had in front of them an envelope like the one in Figure 1.
The information in the envelopes was collected as part of a separate study (Healy (2004)).
In that study, I asked each of the four questions to 116 introductory economics students at
MIT.
The first test of an information endowment effect involves giving the subjects who are
endowed with information about Boston temperature to trade their endowments for information
about gas prices in Bangkok. If there is no information endowment effect, then half the subjects
are expected to trade their endowments. Previous research (Knetsch (1989)) has found that
89% of subjects choose to keep a coffee mug and 90% of subjects keep a chocolate bar when
given the opportunity to trade, evidence of a strong consumption endowment effect. If there
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* Median answer for the 116 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
students who answered the question:
1. From 1961 through 1990, what was the average high daily
temperature in January in Boston?
is an information endowment effect, less than half of the subjects are expected to trade their
envelopes. If this is the case, subjects attach a higher value to information with which they
are endowed than to information with which they are not endowed.
To make the test of an endowment effect valid, the pieces of information that can be traded
need to be of similar value. To see if this was the case, I asked 46 people whether they would
prefer to observe the median answer about Boston temperature or to observe the median answer
about gas prices in Boston. Of those 46 respondents, 21 preferred to observe information about
Boston temperature, so that the hypothesis that half the people would choose information about
temperature and the other half would choose information about gas prices cannot be rejected.
This test showed that the two pieces of information were sufficiently close in value that they
could be used in a trading exercise.
After I explained to subjects the types of available information, subjects who were endowed
with information about question 1 (question 2) were given the opportunity to trade their en-
dowment for information about question 2 (question 1). I and an assistant approached each
carrel and placed an envelope pertaining to the other question next to the endowment envelope.
Each subject; indicated which piece of information they wished to keep by pointing to her chosen
envelope. The unchosen envelope was taken away from each carrel.
Once trading was complete, subjects opened their envelopes and provided final answers to
each of the questions. The ways in which subjects updated their answers is discussed in Section
4.
2.2.3 Part I Results
The evidence from the trading treatments provides strong evidence against an information
endowment effect (Table 1). Of the 84 subjects who participated in the experiment, 43 (51%)
traded their endowment envelope for an envelope that contained information about the other
question. Overall, there was a small preference for information about temperature. 24 (57%) of
the subjects who were endowed with information about temperature traded their endowments
for information about gas prices. Only 19 (45%) of the subjects who were endowed with
information about gas prices traded their endowments for information about temperature.
These results indicate that, in contrast to the previously cited research that documents the
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presence of endowment effects when subjects are endowed with goods like mugs or chocolate
bars, subjects do not show an information endowment effect. This is evidence consistent with
the idea that the endowment effect does not cause subjects to open a separate mental account
when they are endowed with information.
One interesting element of heterogeneity emerges from the trading data that is also repeated
in the auction treatments in the next section. The propensity to trade is significantly higher
for men than for women. Table 2 describes the discrepancy for men and women. While 19 of
the 29 men (66%) traded, only 24 of the 55 women (44%) traded their envelopes. In aggregate,
the larger share of women in the sample led to the overall trading volume being closer to 50%.
The experimental design that was implemented here was meant to eliminate any possible
spurious causes of an endowment effect. In contrast to to other endowment effect experiments,
any minimal transaction cost was eliminated by having subjects point at the envelope they
wished to choose. Placing the second envelope in the carrel and asking the subjects to point at
their preferred envelope eliminates non-trading as a default option. As discussed earlier, the
subject possesses the endowment envelope from the start of the experiment, giving the subject
significantly longer to form an attachment to that envelope as opposed to the one for which she
could trade.
To provide a second test for the presence of information endowment effects, I also conducted
an auction exercise for information relating to the two questions about Bangkok. The results
that I find there are broadly similar to what I find with the trading treatments. Interestingly,
the pattern of a greater preference for endowed information among women as compared to men
also carries over to the auction treatment.
2.3 Experimental Design II
2.3.1 Information auctions
After the trading experiment was completed, the same subjects participated in a treatment
which elicited the values that they attached to information with which they were endowed and
to other information. The subjects were told to take the other small envelope out of the manila
envelope and put it on their desk in front of them. They were told the envelope that they had
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been given contained the median answer given by 130 students at Thammasat University (a
top-ranked university in Bangkok) who answered questions 3 and 4. Subjects were told about
the university where this data was collected as well as the date of collection. Everyone in a
given session was endowed with the same information. Half of the sessions and half of the
participants involved subjects who were endowed with question 3 information; the other half
involved subjects who were endowed with question 4 information.
Again, I conducted a test to check to see if information pertaining to question 3 was of
similar value to information pertaining to question 4. I asked the same 46 people who stated
their preferences for question 1 versus question 2 whether they would prefer to observe the
median answer about Bangkok temperature or to observe the median answer about gas prices
in Bangkok. Of those 46 respondents, 24 preferred to observe information about Bangkok
temperature, so that the hypothesis that half the people would choose information about tem-
perature and the other half would choose information about gas prices cannot be rejected. This
test showed that the two pieces of information were sufficiently close in value that they could
be used in the auction treatments.
Subjects were again told both verbally and on their envelopes that the piece of information
available to them on a given question was the median answer given by the Thai students. The
subjects were also informed that the Thai students were asked to answer the questions in units
that were familiar to them and that the median answer had been translated into units that
were familiar to Loyola Marymount students.
Before observing any information pertaining to either question 3 or question 4, subjects
were informed that they were then going to participate in two auctions: one auction in which
they could buy information and another in which they could sell information. Subjects who
were endowed with information about question 3 (question 4) were told that they would be
able to bid on the opportunity to buy the median Thammasat answer for question 4 (question
3) and that they would also participate in an auction in which they could sell the information
that they had been given that pertained to question 3 (question 4).
In the buying auction, subjects would provide the price that they would be willing to pay
(WTP) for information about question 4 (question 3). All of the bids would be collected and
the five highest; bidders would be declared the winners of the auction. They would receive
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envelopes with information pertaining to question 4 (question 3) and would pay the amount
of the sixth highest bid. Subjects were given a $5 budget for buying information and told
that any unused amount from this budget would be added to their payments. In the selling
auction, subjects would provide the price that they would be willing to accept (WTA) to sell
the information they had been given about question 3 (question 4). All of the selling bids
would be collected and the five lowest bidders would be declared the winners of the auction.
They would hand in their envelopes and each would receive the amount of the sixth lowest bid.
Similar to List's (2003) field experiments with sports memorabilia, the subjects were told
that, under this mechanism, it was in their interest to choose selling and buying prices that
reflected the actual values that they put on the information. This fact was demonstrated
through a simple practice auction that demonstrated how the auction mechanism worked.
When practice was complete, each subject wrote down her WTP for question 4 (question
3) information and her WTA for her endowed question 3 (question 4) information. Each
subject did this by checking off her selected bid from the choices that ranged from $0.25 to
$5.00 in increments of $0.25. Then the bids were collected and the winners were announced,
first for the buying auction and then for the selling auction. Some subjects ended up with no
information, some had information about only one question, and others had information about
both question 3 and question 4. After all transactions were complete, subjects were instructed
that they could open their envelopes and examine the information. Subjects then gave their
final answers to questions 3 and 4.
2.3.2 Part II results
The buying and selling prices that the subjects chose provide further evidence against the
presence of a significant endowment effect. In keeping with the results from the trading
experiment, the female subjects put higher relative value on endowed information than do the
male subjects. For women, in fact, the selling price for information is significantly higher than
the buying price, although the difference in prices is not large. In the overall data, there is
no significant difference between the average buying and selling prices. The average chosen
buying bid is slightly lower than the average chosen selling bid.
Table 3 describes the general results from the auctions. The average buying price (WTP)
82
was $2.49 and the average selling price (WTA) was $2.81. The difference between the two
is not significant at conventional levels. These results contrast with the large and significant
differences between WTP and WTA that have been found when subjects are endowed with
goods.
The general equality between the mean WTP and WTA in the overall sample extends to
the two treatments. For the group that was endowed with the median Thai answer about the
Bangkok temperature (question 3), the mean WTP was $2.60 and the mean WTA was $2.88.
For the group endowed with gas price (question 4) information, the mean WTP was $2.38 and
the mean WTA was $2.74. In each case, the difference between the WTP and WTA was not
significant, so that the null hypothesis of no endowment effect cannot be rejected.
The small difference between the mean WTA and the mean WTP comes entirely from the
female subjects in the sample. Table 4 shows the breakdown of WTP and WTA values by
gender. Male subjects actually had a slightly larger WTP than WTA, although the difference
is insignificant ($2.68 compared to $2.51). Female subjects had a significantly smaller mean
WTP compared to mean WTA ($2.38 compared to $2.97). This corresponds to the trends that
were observed in the trading treatments. Relative to the male subjects, the female subjects
put higher value on endowed information compared to the other available information. In
the aggregate, in each case, the null hypothesis of no information endowment effect cannot be
rejected. In the auction treatment, the WTA is significantly larger for women, although the
difference between the WTA and the WTP is still much smaller than the differences found when
subjects are endowed with goods such as mugs.3
While the average WTP and WTA values are generally of similar magnitude, some interest-
ing behavior underlies this similarity. Specifically, a large group chose $3 as the selling price.
Of the 82 subjects who participated in the auctions, 18 (22%) chose exactly $3. In both the
buying or selling auctions, no other price was chosen half as frequently. Figures 2 and 3 show
the full distribution of chosen buying and selling prices. Subjects appear to perhaps think
more carefully about their buying prices then they do about the selling prices. The tendency
to settle on a whole dollar amount may reflect a coarser valuation of the endowed information.
3 As a rough rule, endowment increases valuation by a factor of two in the cases of goods such as mugs (Knetsch
(1989), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990)).
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It is still clear that, while it seems subjects treat selling somewhat differently than they do
buying, there is no systematic difference between WTP and WTA values. Endowment does
not increase how the subjects value information.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 How information was used
This experimental design, in contrast to previous work that looked at goods, makes it possible
to investigate how endowment affects utilization. Does being endowed with information cause
an individual to weight it differently? Other research has found that agents are more willing to
not view a movie if it they were given it for free than if they had paid for it ( ). Agents were less
willing to ignore sunk costs when they paid for the item that they would be returning without
using. This research makes it possible to specifically answer the question of how endowment
affects utilization. One way to get at this question would involve seeing if an agent uses a
coffee mug more when she is endowed with it rather than paying for it.
Here, it is possible to test the hypothesis that subjects use information the same whether
they were endowed with it or they had to pay for it. This involves making the assumption
that subjects' buying and selling prices reflect their valuations in the same way. The close
correspondence between the mean WTP and WTA values justifies this assumption. Given this
assumption, we can look at how the people who choose high valuations use the information
for a given question. For example, consider a subject who values a question's information at
$4.00. If the subject is endowed with the information, her selling bid would fail. If she is not
endowed, her buying bid would be successful and she would acquire the information. We can
compare how the endowed person treats the information compared to the unendowed person.
Table 6 describes the median answers that were available to be seen. For each question,
the median answer that a subject could have observed is quite close to the correct answer.
A significant number of subjects who observed information simply chose the observed median
when picking a final answer, both for question 3 and for question 4. Of those 49 subjects who
kept their endowed information by failing to win the selling auction, 25 (51%) chose the answer
they observed. Of those 32 subjects who obtained information by winning the buying auction,
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15 (47%) chose exactly the answer that they observed.
More generally, the way in which subjects update their answers upon observing information
can be captured by defining the magnitude of the update to be:
Weight given to observed median = max 1, 1 Initial answer - Observed median )
Initial answer - Observed median
The weight is bounded from above at one to account for subjects like the one who initially
answered 74'F for question 3, observed the Thai median of 90°F and then gave a final answer
of 93°F. The weight captures the extent to which subjects change their answers after observing
information. If a subject does not change her answer, the estimated weight is zero. If a subject
chooses the observed median, the estimated weight is one.
Table 7 shows the average weights for subjects who observed their endowed information
since their selling bids failed and for subjects who observed information that they purchased.
The table shows that the information is used in similar ways whether it is endowed or purchased.
The average weight that endowed subjects use is 0.87, compared to an average weight of 0.91 for
subjects who purchased their information. Due to the fact that there were only five winners (out
of 14 subjects) in the buying and selling auctions in each session, the average winning buying
price is somewhat higher than the average winning selling price. To ensure that information
is treated in the same way independent of whether it is endowed or purchased, the second row
in Table 7 looks at how information is treated for the 22 highest buying bids and 22 highest
selling bids. In each case, subjects put an average weight of 0.89 on the observed information.
The results make it clear that endowment does not affect how the information is used.
Subjects use the information they observe in nearly identical ways whether the information is
purchased or endowed.
2.4.2 Subject earnings and information valuation
The experimental design also makes it possible to look at whether or not subjects appropriately
value the information available to them. The results here are only suggestive, since the infor-
mation available to subjects happens to be quite close to the correct answers, as is seen in Table
6. This should not be surprising to the subjects, since it could be reasonably expected that
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residents of Boston or Bangkok would have precise knowledge of gas prices and temperature
there.
Subjects whose initial answers to the questions are further from the correct answers value
the available information somewhat higher than do the subjects with more accurate initial
answers, however the differences are not significant. Table 8 displays the results of regressing
the distance between subjects' initial answers and the correct answer on the revealed valuation
of that information. For each question, there is no significant difference. The point estimates
for question 3 predict that a subject whose answer is 2 degrees further from the correct answer
of 90°F would value the information at $1 higher. The point estimates for question 4 indicate
that a subject whose answer is $0.10 further from the correct answer of $1.42 would place $1
higher value on information pertaining to that question.
The results of the auction confirm that the auctions, in particular the buying auctions, work
well. Table 9 shows the results from regressing subjects' total payments on their buying bids,
their selling bids, and both of these. In each case, the estimated coefficients on the buying
bid and selling bid variable are close to zero and the hypothesis that information valuation is
independent of subjects' payments cannot be rejected. The coefficient is almost exactly zero
in the case of the buying auctions, corresponding to the earlier empirical finding that subjects
were more willing to carefully specify their buying prices than their selling prices. In both
auctions, the evidence shows that the markets find an efficient price. The buying and selling
prices are set such that, whether or not they win the auction, subjects on average do equally
well.
This finding that the winning bids are efficient confirm the earlier findings that there is no
information endowment effect. When subjects are endowed with information, markets work
well and behavioral anomalies do not occur.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an unusual experiment that endowed subjects with information
rather than goods. Previous experiments have provided evidence suggesting the existence of
an endowment effect for goods. If correct, this anomaly calls into question the assumptions
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underlying our most basic models of consumer behavior. Given the far reaching implications of
the endowment effect, it is important to understand what mechanism underlies this behavioral
anomaly.
The results in this paper point towards the endowment effect operating on preferences as
opposed to judgment. If an agent values a good such as a coffee mug at twice as high a price
if the mug is part of her endowment, either she could believe that the coffee mug is actually
worth twice as much to the average consumer or she could understand that the mug was only
more valuable to her without having her perceptions of its general value being affected. In the
latter case, the agent's preferences are affected by endowment; in the former case, the agent's
judgment is affected.
The experimental design eliminated the possibility of the endowment effect operating on
preferences. Since the information could not be consumed, it does not enter the utility function.
Any information endowment effect could only be reflected through judgment. Someone could
irrationally believe that their information was better than it was because it belonged to them.
The results reported here show that this is not the case. No information endowment effect
arises. Here, at least, endowment does not distort judgment. This provides evidence pointing
towards the endowment effect exerting influence only on agents' preferences and not on their
judgment.
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Table I
Summary Statistics for the Trading Experiment
Percent p -value for test
Variable traded of trading volume = 50%
All subjects (n =84) 51%
Endowed with question 1 57% 0.83
Endowed with question 2 45%
a. Question 1 refers to the January temperature in Boston.
b. Question 2 refers to gas prices in Boston.
Table II
Summary Statistics for the Trading Experiment, by Gender
Variable
All subjects (n =84)
Male subjects (n =29)
Female subjects (n =55)
Percent
traded
51%
66%
p -value for test
of trading volume = 50%
0.83
0.1
44% 0.35
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Table III
Summary Statistics for Auction Treatments
A. Mean buying and selling prices
WTP
meanVariable
All subjects (n=82)
Endowed with question 1 (n =40)
Endowed with question 2 (n =42)
$2.49
(1.22)
$2.60
(1.16)
$2.38
(1.27)
WTA
mean
$2.81
(1.29)
$2.88
(1.28)
$2.74
(1.31)
p -value for test of
mean WTP = mean WTA
0.12
0.33
0.23
B. Median buying and selling prices
WTP
medianVariable
All subjects (n =82)
Endowed with question 1 (n =40)
Endowed with question 2 (n =42)
$2.50
$2.75
$2.13
WTA p -value for test of
median equality of distributions
$3.00
$3.00
$3.00
0.09
0.49
0.1
a. Question 3 refers to the January temperature in Bangkok and Question 4 refers to gas prices in Bangkok.
b. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
c. Two subjects in the first session refused to participate in the auctions.
Table IV
Summary Statistics for Auction Treatments, by Gender
WTP WTA p -value for test of
Variable mean mean mean WTP = mean WTA
All subjects (n =82) $2.49 $2.81 0.12
(1.22) (1.29)
Male subjects (n =29) $2.69 $2.52 0.63
(1.18) (1.27)
Female subjects (n =53) $2.38 $2.97 0.02
(1.23) (1.28)
a. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table V
Winning Selling and Buying Prices, by Session
Winning buying price
$3.00
$2.00
$2.75
$3.50
$3.50
$2.50
Winning selling price
$2.50
$2.25
$3.00
$3.00
$2.50
$2.25
a. In sessions 1, 3, and 5, subjects were endowed with information about Bangkok temperature.
In sessions 2, 4, and 6, subjects were endowed with information about gas prices in Bangkok.
b. The winning buying price was the sixth-highest bid; the winning selling price was the sixth-lowest bid.
Table VI
Median and Correct Answers to the Questions
Question
A. Questions about Boston
1
2
B. Questions about Bangkok
3
4
Median answer given by
MIT or Thammasat students
35°F
$1.80
90°F
$1.51
Correct answer
36°F
$1.90
90°F
$1.42
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Session
1
2
3
4
5
6
a. Questions 1 and 3 refer to the high daily January temperature; questions 2 and 4 refer to gas prices.
b. For questions 1 and 2, the median refers to the distribution of MIT student answers.
For questions 3 and 4, the median refers to the distribution of Thammasat student answers.
Table VII
Weights Given to Purchased and Endowed Information
Session Average weight
A. Endowed subjects
All subjects whose selling bids fail ( = 49) 0.87
22 highest selling bids 0.89
B. Subjects who purchased information
All subjects whose buying bids win b = 32) 0.91
22 highest buying bids 0.89
a. In sessions 1, 3, and 5, subjects were endowed with information about Bangkok temperature.
In sessions 2, 4, and 6, subjects were endowed with information about gas prices in Bangkok.
b. The winning buying (selling) price was the sixth-highest (sixth-lowest) bid.
Table VIII
Relationship Between Accuracy of Initial Answer and Information Valuation
Question Regression
coefficient
A. Question 3. Bangkok temperature
Both buying and selling bids e = 82) 2.04
(1.28)
Just buying bids (n = 40) 0.91
(1.80)
Just selling bids (n = 42) 3.05
(1.92)
A. Question 4. Bangkok gas prices
Both buying and selling bids 0 = 82) 0.10
(0.13)
Just buying bids (n = 42) -0.15
(0.18)
Just selling bids (n = 40) 0.29
(0.20)
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. For questions 1 and 2, the median refers to the distribution of MIT student answers.
For questions 3 and 4, the median refers to the distribution of Thammasat student answers.
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Table IX
Total Payments and Information Valuation
Dependent variable: Total payments received by the subject
Variable Regression coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
Selling bid 0.27
(0.32)
Buying bid
Constant 15.27
(1.00)
0.27
(0.33)
0.03
(0.35)
15.19
(1.39)
0.00
(0.34)
16.04
(0.96)
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
94
.... . . . . .£""" ""'".,,. .,.,
J 1II11111111111!lillll IIIllil!lll! ililillllill Ii!! 11!lllu; I
18
a
a 2
Buying bid
3 4 5
Figure 2: Histogram for chosen buying prices
~c
Q)
:J
CT
Q)
U:
18
a
a
I..J..... ....... .... .... .. . . . . .... ... .. . ....... .. . . . . ..:.:.: .:.:.:............::=::: :::::;=::::: ::::::............... .... .... .... ....... .:::::: :::::' ::::::.........
2
Selling bid
3 4 5
Figure 3: Histogram for chosen selling prices
95
Chapter 3
A Spatial Picture of Poverty and
Inequality in Thailand: Estimates
and a Demonstration
Summary 3 We provide the first comprehensive estimates of Thai poverty and inequality at
levels below the changwat (province). We do this by combining a household survey, which has
income and consumption data, with the 2000 Census, which is representative at the level of the
individual. To improve the precision of our estimates, we propose improvements to the methods
previously applied in other settings. We produce estimates that correspond closely to those
produced by the survey alone at the province level. In addition to passing this test, the standard
errors on the district-level estimates of poverty and inequality are actually smaller than the
changwat-level estimates that come from the household survey. We conclude by demonstrating
the potential for this spatial decomposition to improve policy. If policymakers want to reduce
the poverty gap, our results can help direct resources in a much more effective way than was
previously possible.
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3.1 Introduction
Until recently, in most developing countries, available national data could only tell policymakers
if an entire province is poor. Household surveys, the best available data source about household
income and consumption, are generally only representative at the province level. In Thailand,
for example, the changwat (province) is the stratum in the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) and
the lowest attainable geographic level of disaggregation for SES-based poverty and inequality
measures. There are seventy-six changwat in Thailand, a country of sixty million people.
Policymakers interested in doing a better job of targeting the poor in Thailand have pointed to
the need for a more precise spatial description of poverty and inequality.
This is of even greater interest due to the recent decentralization currently taking place in
Thailand. Previously, the federal government directly disbursed nearly all funds, with there
being little local discretion. In the last few years, Thailand has moved towards more local
control of policy implementation. As a greater balance develops between local and federal
authority, the ability to implement policies on a local level will increasingly be present. This
makes a disaggregated description of poverty and inequality especially valuable.
In this paper, we present results that provide this information. We do this by combining the
2000 Socio-Economic Survey (SES) with the 2000 Population and Housing Census. With some
important improvements, we apply the poverty mapping methodology developed in Elbers,
Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) to the Thai case.1 The basic idea that we apply here is quite
simple.
The strength of the household survey is the comprehensive data it provides for each house-
hold in the sample. Specifically, it reports household income and consumption data. It is,
however, representative only at the level of the changwat (province). On the other hand, the
Census covers all households, but it lacks data on household income and consumption.
By combining the two data sources, we can take advantage of the strengths that each
possesses. We use the SES to model income and consumption as functions of correlated
variables. We choose right-hand side variables that both the SES and Census report. The
'For papers that have combined survey and Census data to spatially decompose poverty and inequality
estimates, see Hentschel et al. (2000) for Ecuador, Alderman (2002) et al. for South Africa, and Mistiaen et al.
(2002) for Madagascar.
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model that best fits for the SES households can then be used to predict income and consumption
for the Census households. Using careful econometrics to get the correct standard errors, we
obtain estimates of poverty and inequality at all levels of geographic aggregation, from the
changwat all the way down to the village. The standard errors become larger for lower levels
of spatial aggregation. We find that we obtain estimates with reasonable standard errors down
to the tambon (subdistrict) level. The standard errors for our estimates at the district level
are actually somewhat smaller than the estimates obtained using the SES alone at the province
level.
Of course, a precise picture matters only to the extent that we can verify that picture's
accuracy. Fortunately, we can compare our results at the changwat level against the household
survey's estimates. We show that our estimates of poverty and inequality correspond closely
to the changwat level estimates that the SES gives. The estimates found in the poverty map
are within the 95% confidence intervals for the changwat poverty and inequality estimates from
the SES approximately 95% of the time. When we look at the level of the region, of which
there are five in Thailand, the map and the SES show an extremely close correspondence.
These results indicate that the map can be useful in targeting policies to geographic levels
below the changwat. At levels well below 5,000 households, we produce estimates of poverty
and inequality that have standard errors of the same size as those obtained at the changwat
level using the SES. We now can say a tambon (subdistrict) is poor with the same confidence
we could previously apply to an entire changwat.
The primary usefulness of the estimates we report is as an input to guide policy and further
research. To demonstrate the value of our results, we ask a policy question. If the goal
is reducing the poverty gap, how much greater of a reduction can be achieved by using our
estimates as opposed to the data previously available? Given the precision with which we can
estimate poverty at even the subdistrict level, the answer is not surprising. Our results have
the ability to lead to a much more effective allocation of resources.
Section 2 describes the Thai data and the methodology that we apply to it. Section 3
compares our results to those produced by the SES for high levels of geographic aggregation.
Section 4 reports our estimates of poverty and inequality at the amphoe and tambon level.
Section 5 considers a modified model that can be used in addition to our primary estimates.
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In Section 6, we demonstrate that these estimates make possible significant improvements in
resource allocation. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Poverty Mapping Methodology and the Data
3.2.1 Methodology
Our goal is to predict income and consumption for the Census households. To do this, we find
variables that are present both in the Census and the household survey (SES). These variables
are then used to estimate models of income and consumption for the survey households.2 The
coefficients (and their standard errors) and the resulting residuals then enable us to estimate
income and consumption for the Census households.
Finding variables present in both the Census and the household survey
The first step is to identify the variables that are present in the SES and the Census, and
identically defined in each data set. These variables will form the set from which we choose the
variables in our income and consumption models. Before estimating those models, we run tests
to confirm that variables are identically defined in the two datasets. We do this by comparing
the changwat means for each variable between the Census and the SES. If a variable really is
defined in the same way, then we should not reject a test of equality between the Census mean
and the SES mean.
We consider household asset, demographic, and occupational variables that are plausibly
correlated with income or consumption. 3 To ensure that variables are defined the same way
in the Census and the SES, we check to see if the Census mean (taken to be the truth) falls
in the 95% confidence interval for that variable's mean that we find in the SES.4 We find the
2For India, Deaton and Taorozzi (2000) and Taorozzi (2002) use related methods to estimate consumption for
the National Sample Survey (NSS) households. They have a set of variables that they know are well-measured
and use them to estimate consumption for the households, leading to estimates of Indian poverty and inequality.
Their goal is to resolve problems with the NSS, while ours is to obtain a spatial picture of poverty and inequality.
3See Appendix A for a list of all the variables that are considered in the zero stage.
4To be more precise, we should use more than a variable's first moment. Most of our variables will be
dummies, however, making the mean a sufficient statistic for the distribution. We have performed sensitivity
checks for other variables, and find that looking at higher moments adds no change to the set of variables that
pass the zero stage.
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variables that pass this test for each changwat, urban and rural. To avoid the possibility that
any variables essentially act as a dummy for a given household or two, we only consider dummy
variables that have a mean greater than 0.03 and less than 0.97. Some of the strata in the
SES have less than one hundred households. For such a stratum, a dummy variable that has
mean 0.99 is zero for all households, save one. This variable then acts as a dummy for that
household in any model. Since the goal is to estimate income and consumption for the Census
households, this is clearly not a variable that can be helpful in constructing an appropriate
model. The household represented by the dummy variable cannot be identified in the Census.
Even if it could, we would not want to use a degree of freedom representing one household,
when we need to predict income and consumption for all the Census households.
Selection of household-level correlates
After ascertaining which variables are defined in the same way in the Census and SES, we model
household income or consumption in the SES as a function of the variables that pass the zero
stage. Where Ych refers to log income of household h in cluster c (the cluster is the village in
the SES), XCh denotes the set of available regressors, and rc are village dummies, our regression
equation is
Ych = E(ychlXch, 7c) + Uch = Xch+c +y Uch . (3.1)
We improve the previous methodology by including village dummies in the regression. In this
way, we pick the household variables that best correlate with the household-level variation in
income. Since later steps will account for location-level variation, our aim is to choose the
variables that specifically capture household-level variation.
It is important to note that regression equation (3.1) does not describe a causal relationship.
The usual concerns about endogeneity do not apply to our models. We are interested in
obtaining consistent estimates of income and consumption for the Census households; we are not
concerned with any of the individual regression coefficients. We assume that uch is distributed
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix E. A stepwise regression selects all variables
that are significant at the 5% level.
There is a question as to whether the regressions should be estimated using the household
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weights provided in the SES. Note that the usual arguments against weighting do not apply
in our context. Our regression is descriptive and thus weights may be needed to provide a
consistent estimate of the population regression function (Deaton (1998)). Since a Hausman
test rejects parameter equality at a 5% level for most of the provinces, we use the household
weights provided in the SES when estimating our models. Table 1 summarizes the results of
the tests that we conducted for consumption in the rural areas.
Selection of location-level correlates
After choosing household-level variables, we then select variables to absorb the location com-
ponent of the variance. We choose from Census means at the village level for rural areas and
Census means at the tambon level for urban areas.5 For rural areas, the 1999 Village Survey
provides additional candidate variables to model the effect of location on income and consump-
tion. This is particularly helpful since poverty in Thailand, as in most developing economies,
is concentrated in rural areas. We discuss this in Section 3.
We cannot use location dummies to predict income in the Census because we can only
estimate parameters for the SES villages. We can certainly include village dummies in the
model that we use in the SES. However, this would not be useful since we need to model
income and consumption for all the Census households and only a very small number of the
Census villages are contained within the SES sample.
Consequently, we approximate the location effect with location-level regressors that are
available in the Census. To do this, we estimate a village effect from regression (3.1) and
regress it on the set of location variables. Our regression equation, where ,c is the estimated
village effect from (3.1), is
;7c = Zc + vch, (3.2)
where ZT are the location variables, i = t (tambon) for urban areas, and i = c (village) for rural
areas. Here we employ a forward stepwise regression procedure that ensures all the previously
selected household variables remain and then adds any location variables that are significant at
5We cannot use village-level means due to a limitation in our ability to match village identifiers between the
SES and the Census for urban areas.
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the 5% level.
Modeling the residual distribution
The stepwise regressions (3.1) and (3.2) select the set of household and location variables that
we use to model income and consumption. To simulate income and consumption for the Census
households, we also need to consider the distribution of the residuals from the regression of log
income and consumption on the selected household and location variables.
Where the superscript S indicates the set of selected variables, Xc TS denotes the set of
selected household variables, and Z7,S denotes the set of selected location variables, we have
Ych = XcTh +Zi ' + Uc (3.3)
We model the residual as having a cluster component and a household component.
Uch = 77c + ech
Both due to the frequent presence of a significant location component and the fact that the
variance of eh depends on observables, we can easily reject homoskedasticity of Uch. To
better simulate household income and consumption, we model this heteroskedasticity so that
our simulations draw appropriately distributed error terms.
To do this, we take the residual from the regression of Ych on the selected household and
location variables, UCh, and break it up into a cluster component and a household component.
We then use a logistic model to find the conditional variance of the household component.
Where ech is the household component of the residual and HT denotes household and location-
level variables including squares, cubes, and interactions, the regression we consider is
In[ ech 2+ =H + rch (3.4)
The constant A is 1.05*max{e2h}, and bounds the predicted variance between 0 and 1.05A.
We apply X = 0.001. For Thailand, we found that failing to use 0.001 or some other small
constant causes too much weight to be put on a couple of households in some cases. Even with
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our safeguards to ensure that no variable or combination of variables enters that essentially acts
as a dummy for a given household, it is still our experience that sometimes a household will have
a very small residual from (3.3). With this adjustment, we find that neither households with
large residuals nor those with small residuals interfere with the choice of appropriate variables
for the heteroskedasticity model. The delta method and a first-order Taylor approximation
gives the following estimate for the conditional variance of ech, where B = exp(H6Th) and - is
the estimated variance of rh 6:
-2 EAB - A 1 2 AB(1-0b-B) (3.5)
e ch [I- B -2 r (1- + B)3
We use the above variance estimator to generate a set of standardized household residuals.
We then draw the location component and the household component either directly from the
standardized residuals or from the most appropriate parametric distribution.7 We consider
normal and t distributions for the household error. Whether one of these parametric distrib-
utions is employed or we draw from the empirical distribution has little effect on the resulting
poverty and inequality estimates.
We obtain GLS estimates of the parameters and then conduct simulations to assign error
terms to households. This enables us to generate estimates and confidence intervals for the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indices, the Atkinson inequality measures, and the Gini coeffi-
cient at any level of geographic aggregation. We focus on the headcount index and the Gini in
this paper.
3.2.2 The data
The income data we use comes from the 2000 Socio-Economic Survey. This is a stratified
random sample of 24,747 Thai households. There are 76 strata, one for each changwat. Each
of these strata is divided into three categories: urban, sanitary district, and rural. The Census
has only two categories, rural and urban, and we employ the Census definition when classifying
6 We thank Chris Elbers for helping with this derivation.
7We model a location component of the residual wherever possible. If the location variables capture the
location effect particularly well, the fact that the estimate of the household variance is not the true value means
that we can get a negative variance estimate for the location part of the residual. For these cases, we estimate
the model without a location component to the residual.
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households as either urban or rural.
Providing the greater coverage we need to obtain spatially disaggregated estimates of poverty
and inequality is the 2000 Population and Housing Census. The short form of the Census
completely covers the population. It has data on household composition, education, and
occupations, but not assets. The 20% subsample also has information on assets. We have
produced Thai maps using both the 100% sample and the 20% sample. We found that the
greater precision that comes from the richer set of variables in the 20% sample dominates the
loss of coverage. As a result, we use the 20% subsample to construct our estimates. 8
We break Bangkok up into four parts due to its size. The division occurs according to the
picture in Figure 1. We report results that aggregate the map estimates for the four parts.
For rural areas, we also include variables from the 1999 Village Survey. The data comes
from a questionnaire sent out to the village headperson in each Thai village. Included is data
on irrigation, the total number of households in a village, and farm assets. In our results, we
find a somewhat better fit for rural areas compared to urban areas, and the extra information
provided by the Village Survey may be the reason.
3.2.3 First-stage results
Compared to similar research previously done elsewhere, we find that the set of chosen regressors
can account for a larger part of the variance in income and consumption. This likely speaks,
in part, to the high quality of the Thai data. The SES is known for its reliability among the
household surveys available outside the industrialized countries (Townsend and Gine (2003)).
Table 2 shows the median number of regressors and the median number of households per
stratum, for each of the regions. It also describes the quality of fit of the regression model
in the last two columns, which describe the median and average R2 for the models, again by
region. Notice that a relatively small number of regressors are capable of accounting for a large
share of the variation in rural consumption. In Thailand as a whole, the median number of
included regressors is 11 with a median of 147 households in the models. On average, 70.9% of
8While the 20% sample gives the most precise results down to the tambon level, this should add an extra
bit of caution in considering results at the village level. Using the 20% sample introduces error in the Census
means, since they are now only an estimate of the population mean. We estimate that this only becomes an
issue for population units of 25 households or less. Details of these calculations are available upon request.
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the variation in consumption is accounted for by the regressors that are included in the models.
This means that most of the variation in our simulations will come from variation in the chosen
regressors and those coefficients, as opposed to that variation introduced by the error term
draws.
The qualitative nature of the results seen in Table 2 for rural consumption holds true for
urban areas and for income. The set of regressors, on average, account for over 70% of the
variance in consumption. This ability to precisely model income and consumption leads to
the small standard errors for tambon-level poverty and inequality estimates that we report in
Section 4.
3.3 Region and Changwat Results: Comparisons with the SES
Our contribution is to provide estimates of poverty and inequality at geographical levels like
the amphoe and the tambon. Since our work has provided the first of these estimates for
Thailand,9 we cannot check our estimates at these levels. Here, though, we show that the
estimates produced by the methodology at the region and changwat level and compare to what
the SES gives. The close tracking confirms that our estimates perform well. 10
Of course, these results are not are primary goal; our primary contribution comes from the
amphoe and tambon estimates that we report in Section 4. The close correspondence between
our results at the changwat level and the SES estimates, though, gives us confidence about
our results at lower geographic levels. In other words, the fact that our estimates match the
SES at the region and changwat levels means that we can trust our estimates of poverty and
inequality at the amphoe and tambon levels. The reported results refer to normally distributed
error terms, but the qualitative nature of the results is the same with other error distributions.
9More precisely, our work provides the first of these estimates based on the directly collected, national data
sets collected by the Thai government. Another data set, based on letters sent to village leaders, gives a partial
list of poor villages in Thailand. The limitations of, and concerns about, this list helped to motivate Thai
officials into seeking the results reported here.
l°We focus on the headcount and the gini in the discussion. The correspondence between the map and the
SES carries over to other measures, such as the Atkinson inequality index and the poverty gap. Details are
available from the authors upon request.
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3.3.1 Poverty
Consider first the comparison at the region level. Table 3 shows the comparisons for the
headcount index for rural areas. In all cases, the map estimate of poverty is well within the
95% confidence interval generated by combining the point estimates and standard errors for
both the map and SES estimates. What is particularly encouraging is that the tracking seen in
Table 3 comes not from large standard errors but from a close tracking in the point estimates.
Nationally, the estimates of poverty differ by less than a percentage point. The tracking
is also very close for the North, the South, and for income in the North. The tracking is
somewhat less precise for the Central and for consumption in the Northeast. We will discuss
some of the results for the Central in greater detail in the section on mean income.
We also find a close correspondence between our results and the SES estimates for the
headcount in urban areas. Table 4 shows this comparison. Again, the national estimates
differ by less than a percentage point. In addition, the estimate for the South, the Northeast,
and Bangkok are all quite close. The Central estimates are somewhat lower in the SES, but the
test for equality is still not close to rejecting at a 5% level. We do reject the test for equality
for consumption in the North, with an asymptotic z-statistic of 1.98. In other words, the test
for equality cannot be rejected for 21 of the 22 comparisons presented in Tables 3 and 4.
At the changwat level, the correspondence between the map and the SES is also encouraging.
Tables (7) and (8) in Appendix A display the results for urban and rural areas for the headcount
index, mean income, and the gini. At very low poverty levels, comparisons become difficult.
For example, rural Samutprakan has zero poverty in the SES. This estimate has a standard
error of zero, and thus we will reject equality for any non-zero map estimate of poverty.
Consider those provinces with at least 2% poverty estimates in the SES. In rural areas,
97% of the comparisons out of 63 possible accept the hypothesis of equality between the map
and the SES for income. The hypothesis cannot be rejected for 90% of the comparisons out
of 59 for consumption. In urban areas, 89% of the comparisons out of 61 cannot reject for
income and 95% out of 56 cannot reject for consumption. If we restrict comparisons to those
changwat where both the map and the SES give poverty estimates of more than 2%, the results
are much the same. There are three less available comparisons for rural consumption and 89%
of the comparisons cannot reject equality.
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In sum, we find a very close tracking between the map and the SES estimates of the head-
count index. for income and consumption in both rural and urban areas. This holds true at the
national, regional, and provincial levels. The robustness of this correspondence should inspire
confidence in our estimates for the headcount at the amphoe and tambon levels.
3.3.2 Mean income
For mean income, the poverty map matches the SES with less frequency. Consider Tables 5
and 6, which contain the comparisons for rural and urban areas. In both urban and rural areas,
we cannot reject equality for any of the regions, but we easily reject equality for Thailand as a
whole for both income and consumption.
Moreover, some of the failure to reject is driven by large standard errors rather than close
tracking between the map and the SES.l l The correspondence is closest for consumption in the
rural and urban North, income in the rural south, and for income and consumption in Bangkok.
The map and the SES are particularly disparate in their estimates of mean income in the urban
Central and North.
Most strikingly, our estimate of mean income is higher in all cases, revealing some sort of bias
in either the SES or in our estimate. While it is not possible to make any certain conclusions,
this finding is consistent with a frequent criticism of household surveys: non-response among
wealthy households that is not reflected in the household weights. For example, Mistiaen and
Ravallion (2003) report that non-reponse is higher among wealthy households in the US Current
Population Survey and thus that the survey seriously underestimates American inequality.
Deaton has documented this concern for a variety of countries, most notably India.l2 This
sort of non-random non-response is consistent with the finding that our estimates for mean
income are higher than those produced by the SES alone.
To see this, notice that our estimates would not be biased by the presence of non-random
non-response in the SES. The model of income or consumption that we estimate for the
changwat is valid for the households that are included in the sample. The coefficients and
l These standard errors are driven in large part by the substantial heterogeneity observed among the changwat
in any region.
12 It is believed in Thailand's National Statistical Office that the SES may suffer from this problem. The
NSO is presently considering a research effort into the importance of wealthy non-response in the SES.
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residuals that we use to model income or consumption for the Census households continue to
be valid. Since the Census has universal coverage, our estimates are not biased by non-response
in the SES.
The finding that our estimates of mean income are higher than the SES estimates carries
over to the changwat results, which are shown in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix A. For rural
areas, the test for equality between the map and the SES passes 89% of the time for income
and 84% of the time for consumption. For urban areas, the equality test passes only 77% of
the time for income and 87% of the time for consumption. In 46 of the 47 times in which the
equality test fails to pass, the map estimate of income or consumption is higher than the SES
estimate.
Supporting the idea that wealthy non-response is driving the discrepancies seen in Tables 5
and 6 is the fact that the poverty map matches the household survey quite closely for measures
where this is not relevant (the headcount), somewhat closely when this is of lesser importance
(the gini), and much less closely for the measure where this of greatest importance (mean
income). All results are consistent with the idea that the poverty map performs as one would
hope and that there is non-response by the wealthy in the SES.
3.3.3 Inequality
The gini coefficient is broadly the same in the comparisons between the map and the SES. For
all regions, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the gini is the same in the SES and the map.
Tables 7 and 8 describe all the comparisons for the gini.
The tracking is very close in most cases, and the ranking of regions is identical in the
map and SES. The only note of caution to add to this is the fact that 15 of the 18 regional
comparisons give higher ginis in our estimates than in the SES. Again, this is consistent with
some underrepresentation of the wealthy in the SES. This may be enough to make the inequality
estimates higher in our estimates than in the SES, but not significantly so.
Confirming the close correspondence seen in Tables 7 and 8 are the changwat comparisons
that can be found in Appendix A. In rural areas, the equality test cannot be rejected for 95%
of the provinces for both income and consumption. The equality test passes in urban areas
95% of the time for income and 97% of the time for consumption.
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As was the case for the headcount, the map produces estimates of inequality that correspond
very closely to the SES estimates. These results and their robustness provide the foundation
for the amphoe and tambon estimates of poverty and inequality that we report in the next
section.
3.4 Thai Poverty and Inequality at the Tambon Level
Figures 2, 3, and 4 report our estimates for the tambon level, in map form. These maps show
clearly how much more precise a picture of Thai poverty our maps are able to paint. There
are 7411 tarnbon in Thailand, 80.2% of which are either entirely urban or entirely rural. On
average, then, the tambon level is approximately 1/60 the size of a changwat. 13
Despite the much lower level of geographic aggregation, the standard errors at the tambon
level in the poverty map are actually lower than at the changwat level in the SES. This holds
true for the headcount, mean income, and the gini, both for income and consumption. Tables
9 and 10 show the comparisons both for the mean of the standard errors over the changwat
and for the median.
For all variables, the map provides more precise estimates at the tambon level than the SES
does at the changwat level. This is precisely the administrative level that is presently assuming
greater authority in Thailand. Given the performance of the poverty and inequality measures
described in the previous section, Thai officials can use this new information to target policies
at the tambon level with similar confidence to the changwat-level targeting that was previously
possible.
In addition, we use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps to report our tambon
estimates of poverty and inequality. Figure 1 shows the headcount for rural consumption,
figure 2 shows the headcount for urban consumption, and figure 3 shows the gini coefficient for
rural income.
Appendix B contains other GIS maps for the changwat level that are somewhat less visually
taxing. These maps and the estimates behind them provide a more precise picture of poverty
13Specifically, there are 5498 tambon that are only rural, 447 that are only urban, and 1466 tambon that have
both urban and rural parts, for a total of 8877 tambon map estimates. This compares to 151 map estimates at
the changwat level, of which 75 are rural and 76 are urban.
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and inequality in Thailand than was previously available. As shown in Tables 9 and 10, the
complete coverage of the Census enables us to achieve disaggregated estimates of poverty and
inequality with no loss in statistical precision.
3.5 Checking Our Estimates with Field Research
Despite the accuracy of our estimates at the region and province level, we attempted to check
the poverty map results with field research. To do this, we conducted field visits to villages
in Nakhon Sithammarat, a province in southern Thailand. Throughout this paper, we have
emphasized our results at the amphoe and tambon levels. At the level of the village, not
surprisingly, our estimates are considerably less precise. We feel, as a result, that our estimates
are primarily useful at the amphoe and tambon levels.
Still, the observations of the field team largely accorded with the predictions of our estimates,
even at the village level. The instances in which our estimates appeared not to match the actual
picture also provided an opportunity for us to investigate an alternative model for more precise
prediction. Specifically, we found one village where an important variable did not make it into
our models.
This occurs, in part, due to the fact that we run our regression models for the changwat as
a whole. In some cases, it may be possible to run our models for an amphoe instead. For some
large amphoe, the SES has enough households to allow estimation of income and consumption
models. In the few of the cases where the map fails to match the SES, we find that estimating
a model at the lower geographic level may provide the answer to solving the problem.
3.5.1 Validation at the village level
Before the poverty map, the Thai government compiled a partial list of poor villages using a
data set called the NRD2C that came from responses to surveys sent out to village leaders.
We found that this list appears to perform well most of the time, but that problems such as
outdated data hamper the old list. For example, the list classifies some villages as poor in part
due to their lack of irrigated farmland, even though most villagers had ceased to be farmers.
We also found that the list suffers from some inaccuracies in the reporting that seem to be
110
intentional, possibly to manipulate the allocation of funds.
By comparison, the poverty map has several advantages, despite the fact that its primary
value is at the amphoe or district level, where standard errors remain small. First, it accounts
for all localities that might be absent from the NRD2C list because of the different or outdated
categorization of rural villages and urban communities or unreturned questionnaires from village
leaders. Second, it takes advantage of data that the government directly and comprehensively
collects (the SES and the Census). Perhaps due to these strengths, the poverty map appears to
perform at least as well as the NRD2C at measuring poverty in the validation villages, despite
a lack of any direct income or consumption data at the village level.14
The poverty map does not, however, give the correct picture in all the villages. Since the
map standard errors for mean income/consumption, the headcount, and the gini all become
large for the village-level estimates, this is not surprising. Still, we attempted to ascertain why
the model gave a poor prediction in some of the villages. Our preliminary investigation revealed
that the problem may arise because the income/consumption models do not use some village
characteristics that were relevant in predicting the general income of the villages. Most notably
the models do not treat adequately well the fact that many villages in the Southern region
grow para-rubber trees, and prices of raw rubber are always very important in determining the
average income of the villagers. This problem could be overcome by improving the models or
using other secondary data.
In the following section, we explore the former of these possibilities. The comparisons
reported in this paper show that the poverty map generally performs well throughout Thailand.
Finding a more refined model of income or expenditure might be capable of solving any problems
that remain.
3.5.2 Using a model at a lower geographic level
Until now, we have discussed estimates of poverty and inequality that have come from a model
of consumption that applied to an entire changwat. The regression coefficients that generated
each household's estimated income and expenditure were the same throughout the changwat.
14The NRD2C asks villages leaders about the income levels in the village. When compiling the list of poor
villages, this is one of the factors that the NESDB takes into account.
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But, if one district in a changwat produces rubber and another produces textiles, the variables
that correlate with consumption in each are likely to be different in each district. So we
end up choosing between sample size and model precision in our regression models. We have
already attempted to deal with this by allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity. Here, we
also consider using a regression model based at the amphoe level rather than the changwat
level.
The close correspondence between the poverty map and the household survey at the chang-
wat level makes it feasible for us to look at income and expenditure models for some large
amphoe, to supplement the results from the changwat models that we have already discussed.
Within some provinces, enough of the households are located within one amphoe to enable us
to run a regression at that level. We cannot generate changwat-level estimates to compare
with the household survey. Earlier, though, we generated amphoe-level estimates using the
changwat-level regressions. We can compare those estimates with what we obtain by running
amphoe-level regressions.
We consider an amphoe model for one amphoe in each of four rural changwat and four urban
changwat. 15 Table 11 shows the comparisons for the headcount between our original results
from the changwat model and the household survey, at the level of the changwat. Table 12
shows the comparisons for the headcount between our original results and the results obtained
by using an amphoe model, at the level of the amphoe.
Consider Chachoengsao. This is one province where the poverty map and the SES disagree
quite sharply at the changwat level. For the amphoe that we look at in Chachoengsao, the
amphoe model gives a result that would lead to closer correspondence between the map and the
SES. Our original estimate of the headcount was higher than the SES, and the amphoe model
leads to a lower estimate of the headcount for the amphoe than does the changwat model.
On average, the smaller sample size for the amphoe model and its greater precision cancel,
and we get similar standard errors whether we use the changwat or the amphoe model. In
the few places where the map struggles, consideration of more precise models offers hope that
the poverty map methods can still yield accurate estimates of poverty and inequality at the
15The rural changwat are Amnatcharoen, Kamphaengphet, Phuket, and Samutprakan. The urban changwat
are Chachoengsao, Lampang, Loei, and Satun. Here we just consider consumption poverty. Additional results
for mean income and the gini coefficient are available from the authors upon request.
112
amphoe and tambon levels. If Thai officials consider suspect some survey data from one part
of a changwat, they can still generate poverty map estimates for other amphoe by looking at
more precise income and consumption models.
3.6 A Demonstration
In this section, we consider an example of how policymakers could use the estimates reported
in this paper. Specifically, we ask: If the goal is reduction of the poverty gap, how much of
an improvement in resource allocation does our estimates make possible? We find that our
estimates make possible a much more efficient allocation of resources and that they can guide
even simple policies in subtle ways.
The poverty gap is the total distance between household income and the poverty line,
summed over all households with income below the poverty line for annual income or consump-
tion. Where H is the number of households, i indexes the households, zi is household income
(or consumption), and z is the poverty line, the poverty gap in changwat c is
1H
PG, H (xi) 1 ( i > Z)
i= 
Consider a policymaker who wants to reduce the poverty gap as much as possible with $1 of
resources. We consider the marginal dollar to simplify the policymaker's problem. Assume her
utility to be the expected reduction in the poverty gap. The policymaker achieves a reduction
of $1 in the poverty gap if she can target the dollar to any poor household, where we ignore
the possibility of households being within $1 of the poverty line.
Here we consider three kinds of possible targeting: changwat-level, amphoe-level, and
tambon-level. Changwat-level targeting involves the $1 being spread evenly to all the house-
holds in the changwat. Amphoe-level targeting involves the $1 being spread evenly to all the
households in the amphoe, with tambon-level targeting having the analogous definition.
Using the changwat-level targeting possible with the SES alone, a policymaker would target
the changwat with the highest headcount. This clearly indicates that tambon-level targeting
will be optimal in all cases in this model. Since the poorest tambon must be at least as poor as
the changwat as a whole, targeting the poorest tambon will lead to at least as large an expected
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reduction in the poverty gap as targeting the changwat as a whole.
In reality, there are likely to be costs associated with attempting to implement policy at a
lower geographic level. Corruption, most notably, may become more severe. These costs may
outweigh the benefits of more precise targeting.
To model this, we consider iceberg costs of more precise targeting that are analogous to
transport costs in trade theory. If the policymaker chooses amphoe-level targeting, A of the
$1 is lost to corruption. If tambon-level targeting is chosen, A + bT of the $1 is lost to
corruption.
Our spatial decomposition of poverty estimates makes possible different kinds of policies
for different places. Some changwat have relatively uniform poverty rates. For these changwat,
the benefits of targeting at the tambon level are relatively small. Other changwat have large
heterogeneity in poverty rates, and thus large benefits can be obtained by focusing resources
on the poorer areas.
If corruption costs are the same across changwat, then, very different policies will be optimal
in different places. Our estimates can tell policymakers which district or subdistrict is the best
place (among districts or subdistricts) to which to target resources. Beyond that, our estimates
can also help policymakers decide whether it is worth it to attempt targeting at lower geographic
levels. To find out how our estimates can improve policy aimed at reducing the poverty gap, we
compare our estimates for the headcount ratio at the changwat, amphoe, and tambon levels.
The difference between the changwat-level headcount estimate and the amphoe-level headcount
for the poorest amphoe gives the benefit of targeting at the amphoe level compared to the
changwat level.
Likewise, the difference between the amphoe-level headcount estimate for the poorest am-
phoe and the tambon-level headcount for the poorest tambon gives the benefit of targeting at
the amphoe level compared to the tambon level. If the benefits from more precisely targeting
outweigh the corruption costs, the policymaker should target to the lower level.
Here we focus on the results for the Southern region of Thailand, which consists of 17 chang-
wat. We run 200 simulations to estimate the distribution of the improvements in effectiveness
achieved by targeting at the amphoe level compared to the changwat level, and at the tambon
level compared to the amphoe level.
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Table 13 shows the potential improvements for consumption and Table 14 reports the cor-
responding estimates for income.
In general, we find that the potential improvements are larger for poorer places, which is
not surprising. A changwat with near-zero poverty will have near zero poverty in its amphoe
and tambon, and so there is less to be gained by targeting at the amphoe or tambon levels.
For income in Narathiwat, we would expect to achieve a further reduction in the poverty gap
of 16.7% by targeting at the amphoe level rather than the changwat level. We could achieve an
additional improvement of 13.6% by targeting tambon rather than amphoe.
Other results show that sometimes the primary improvement is obtained by targeting at the
amphoe level and other times the primary improvement is obtained by targeting the tambon.
In Yala, we would achieve three times the improvement by going from changwat to amphoe
(17.0%) as we would achieve by going from amphoe to tambon (5.5%). On the other hand, in
Pattani, we would achieve a much larger improvement by going all the way to the tambon level
(a 17.7% improvement compared to a 7.4% improvement).
Moreover, while the greatest potential for the map to improve resource allocation lies in
the poorest areas, there are other changwat where the map can lead to large improvements
in policy. Take Ranong, for example. Even though the headcount estimates for the changwat
is only 9.6Xc, we can achieve a total improvement of 27.9% by targeting policy to the tambon
instead of the changwat (with 22.8% of the improvement coming from moving from the amphoe
to the tambon level). In other words, $1 directed to Ranong at the changwat level would reduce
the poverty gap by only 9.6 cents. Using our estimates to direct $1 to Ranong at the tambon
level would reduce the poverty gap by 37.5 cents. Our estimates improve resource allocation in
this case by a factor of four.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first comprehensive estimates of Thai poverty and inequality at a
geographic level below the changwat (province). We do this by applying the methods developed
in Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003), with some improvements that have proven helpful in
the Thai case. We combine household survey data with Census data to utilize the income data
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in the former and the complete coverage of the latter. To confirm that they are accurate, we
compare our estimates of poverty and inequality at the changwat level to those provided by
the household survey alone. These tests confirm that the models used to predict income and
consumption for the Census households are appropriate ones.
These estimates of poverty and inequality are not an end in themselves, but instead form
a base for policy targeting and future research. Since the late 1980s, Thailand has experienced
a rapid rise in inequality. In the late 1990s, Thailand also endured a severe recession arising
from the financial crisis. The disaggregated estimates of poverty and inequality presented in
this paper offer a new source of information for identifying much more precisely those groups
most affected by these events. We hope that policymakers will take full advantage of the new
poverty and inequality estimates to improve policy targeting and that researchers will use them
to help with future micro studies in Thailand.
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Table 1: Hausman tests of parameter equality for rural consumption
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Table 2: Quality of model fit for rural consumption
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Table 3: Rural headcount in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 4: Urban headcount in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
]27
Table 5: Rural average income and consumption in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6: Urban average income and consumption in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 7: Rural Gini coefficient in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 8: Urban Gini coefficient in the map and the SES
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 9: Average standard errors in the SES compared to the map in rural areas
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Table 10: Median standard errors in the SES compared to the map in rural areas
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Table 11: Changwat-Ievel headcount for consumption (selected changwat)
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 12: Amphoe-Ievel consumption headcount (selected amphoe in changwat
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table A1: Rural headcount in the map and the SES (changwat estimates)
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Table 13: Improvements in reducing the poverty gap achieved by our estimates
(for consumption)
Chumphon 0.034 0.017 0.064
Krabi 0.086 0.026 0.188
Nakhonsithammarat 0.084 0.054 0.034
Narathiwat 0.39 0.133 0.06
Pattani 0.292 0.077 0.311
Phangnga 0.032 0.011 0.042
Phatthalung 0.097 0.034 0.056
Phuket 0.009 0.001 0.02
Ranong 0.129 0.196 0.302
Satun 0.058 0.027 0.086
Songkhla 0.121 0.079 0.144
Suratthani 0.007 0.02 0.015
Trang 0.065 0.031 0.056
Yala 0.106 0.073 0.102
Notes: The expected improvement in poverty gap reduction by targetting to the amphoe is the
average of the difference between the amphoe headcount and the changwat headcount over
the 200 si?1ulations. The expected improvement in poverty gap reduction by targetting to the
tambon is the average of the difference between the amphoe headcount and the changwat
headcount over the 200 simulations.
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Table 14: Improvements in reducing the poverty gap achieved by our estimates
(for income)
Chumphon 0.11 0.046 0.098
Krabi 0.121 0.061 0.136
Nakhonsithammarat 0.143 0.124 0.104
Narathiwat 0.364 0.167 0.136
Pattani 0.318 0.074 0.177
Phangnga 0.035 0.066 0.051
Phatthalung 0.085 0.03 0.056
Phuket 0.009 0.003 0.007
Ranong 0.096 0.051 0.228
Satun 0.071 0.026 0.073
Songkhla 0.067 0.088 0.119
Suratthani 0.06 0.037 0.063
Trang 0.051 0.015 0.096
Yala 0.315 0.17 0.055
Notes: The expected improvement in poverty gap reduction by targetting to the amphoe is the
average of the difference between the amphoe headcount and the changwat headcount over
the 200 simulations. The expected improvement in poverty gap reduction by targetting to the
tambon is the average of the difference between the amphoe headcount and the changwat
headcount over the 200 simulations.
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